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PROVING COPYING

SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH* & PETER S. MENELL**
ABSTRACT
Proof that a defendant actually copied from a copyrighted work is
a critical part of a claim for copyright infringement. Indeed, absent
such copying, there is no infringement. The most common method of
proving copying involves the use of circumstantial evidence, consisting of proof that a defendant had “access” to the protected work, and
a showing of “similarities” between the copy and the protected work.
In inferring copying from the combination of such evidence, courts
have for many decades developed a framework known as the “inverse
ratio rule,” which allows them to modulate the level of proof needed
on access based on the level of similarity, and vice-versa. While
analytically sound, the inverse ratio rule has proven to be a persistent source of confusion among some courts, most prominently the
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Ninth Circuit, causing some to misapprehend the very nature of the
inquiry into copying as well as the manner in which circumstantial
evidence operates. This Article explains how the inverse ratio rule
emanates from crucial insights about the manner in which circumstantial evidence operates, wherein multiple inferences are combined
to enhance the probative value of evidence that is inconclusive in
isolation. This flexible formula builds on the notion of a combined
narrative that is a hallmark of all circumstantial evidence. The
Article unpacks the theoretical and normative logic behind the
inverse ratio rule to show how it is essential to circumstantial proof
of copying, reveals how purported rejections of the doctrine by courts
have been driven by a basic misunderstanding of the manner in
which circumstantial inferences interact, and concludes by drawing
broader insights about the interplay of copyright and evidence law.
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INTRODUCTION
The test for copyright infringement has long been plagued by
confusion. The modern framework was formulated three-quarters
of a century ago when creative, technological, and legal conditions
were considerably different.1 It has nevertheless withstood the test
of time and continues to guide courts around the country.2 Distilled
to its basics, the framework embodies two prongs. In the first,
commonly referred to as “factual copying,” the plaintiff must show
that the defendant appropriated (that is, copied) expression from the
protected work.3 In the second, variously described as “improper
appropriation,” “wrongful copying,” or “substantial similarity” of
protected expression, the judge or jury assesses the substantiality
of that appropriation to determine whether it rises to the level of an
infringement.4 As in some other areas of intellectual property law
dating back to the Founding Era, Congress never set forth an
infringement test, leaving this vital aspect of copyright law to
judicial development.5
1. The seminal articulation of the test is traced back to the Second Circuit’s 1946
decision in Arnstein v. Porter. See 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). While a few pre-Arnstein
cases did deploy elements of its formulation, they did so in a largely piecemeal manner. See
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement Analysis,
68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 843 (2016).
2. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (describing
Arnstein as “the source of modern theory”); Balganesh, supra note 1, at 795.
3. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (describing the test as showing “that defendant copied from
plaintiff ’s copyrighted work”). For more recent uses of this phrase, see Armour v. Knowles,
512 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Compulife Software Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d
1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020); Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2012); Johnson
v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005).
4. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (requiring a showing that the copying “went so far as to
constitute improper appropriation”); Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 100
(2d Cir. 2014) (using “wrongful copying” for the prong); Johnson, 409 F.3d at 18 (describing
the prong as “wrongful copying”); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977) (using the term “substantial similarity”); Yurman
Design, Inc. v. Paj, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (using the term “substantial
similarity” for the prong).
5. See Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and
Ramifications for Statutory Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
63, 67-68, 75 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (noting that the courts developed and
evolved infringement standards using the general purpose of copyright law, “(‘the
encouragement of learning’), common law experimentation, and pragmatism,” and the modern
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The improper appropriation prong has attracted the bulk of
judicial and scholarly attention.6 Originally conceptualized as an
unguided, intuitive assessment to be made by the jury, courts have
struggled to align the law with copyright’s overarching goals.7 This
task has only been rendered more difficult by copyright law’s
institutional setting, namely, the role of the jury in assessing
whether the appropriation was improper or substantial,8 and perceptual differences between lay and expert observers, especially in
specialized and technical fields such as computer software and
music.9
In contrast to improper appropriation, the factual copying prong
of the test has received far less attention from both courts and
Copyright Act (the 1976 Act) took note of the judicial role in developing infringement
standards and perpetuated jurisprudential evolution of such standards (footnote omitted)
(quoting the Copyright Act of 1790 preamble)).
6. The literature on this prong is voluminous. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Improper
Appropriation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 600 (2019); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright
Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719,
723 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, Essay, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright
Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1825 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for
Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203,
206 (2012); Oren Bracha, Not De Minimis: (Improper) Appropriation in Copyright, 68 AM. U.
L. REV. 139, 141 (2018).
7. See, e.g., Dawson, 905 F.2d at 733 (“[O]bedience to the undisputed principles of
copyright law and the policy underlying the ordinary observer test requires ... orientation of
the ordinary observer test to the works’ intended audience, permitting an ordinary lay
observer characterization of the test only where the lay public fairly represents the works’
intended audience.”); Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“[S]ince only some of the design enjoys copyright protection, the observer’s inspection must
be more discerning.”).
8. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (describing improper appropriation as “an issue of fact
which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine”).
9. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, The Use of Technical Experts in
Software Copyright Cases: Rectifying the Ninth Circuit’s “Nutty” Rule, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
663, 673 (2020) (explaining how the Second Circuit in Computer Associates International, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 695, 713 (2d Cir. 1992), recognized the need for expert testimony to
enable jurors to assess similarity and most other circuits have followed its lead and
highlighting that the Ninth Circuit is a notable exception). The Fourth Circuit in Dawson
firmly rejected the approach of refusing to permit expert testimony in a music case, noting
that “only a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a court to embrace a doctrine
that requires a copyright case to turn on the opinion of someone who is ignorant of the
relevant differences and similarities between two works.” 905 F.2d at 735. The court replaced
the “ordinary observer” with the “intended audience” of the work and permitted the fact-finder
to rely on expert testimony. See id. at 736.
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scholars. This is despite the reality that as a factual determination,
it implicates matters of proof and thereby intersects with the basic
principles and rules of evidence that inform the adjudication
process.10 Insofar as this prong has invited greater scrutiny; it has
been in relation to its intersection with the more contentious
improper appropriation determination, and rarely ever on its own
terms.11
As with most matters of proof, courts recognized early on that
factual copying could be established through either direct evidence
or circumstantial proof.12 Direct evidence usually involved a defendant’s admission or on rare occasion, an eyewitness account of the
appropriation.13 When factual copying was disputed by a defendant,
courts invariably resorted to circumstantial evidence and, applying
common sense, assessed the possibility of inferring such copying
from the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct in
relation to the protected work.14 The jurisprudence soon came to
recognize two such points of inference for circumstantial proof of
copying: (i) proof that the defendant had access to the protected
work, and (ii) similarities between the defendant and the plaintiff ’s
works.15
10. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
11. The most probing and influential account of this relationship to date is Alan Latman,
“Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1990).
12. This proposition was considered unexceptional by the nineteenth century. See EATON
S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 428 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co., 1879) (noting that when a defendant denies copying “[a] comparison of
the two works will then be made with the aid of such direct or circumstantial evidence as may
be available”). For early cases using circumstantial evidence to prove copying, see W.H.
Anderson Co. v. Baldwin L. Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1928); Blackburn v. S. Cal. Gas
Co., 14 F. Supp. 553, 554 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 559 (9th Cir.
1941); Gingg v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 56 F. Supp. 701, 705 (S.D. Cal. 1944);
Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1933).
13. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (discussing an “admission” as exemplary of such direct
evidence). For a rare instance where a court relied on the account of witnesses about the
process through which the work at issue was prepared, see W.H. Anderson Co., 27 F.2d at 85
(discussing the testimony of witnesses who described how the printing of the defendant’s work
had been set up in the press).
14. See DRONE, supra note 12, at 428 (noting the importance of such evidence to the
question).
15. See Harold Lloyd Corp., 65 F.2d at 39 (McCormick, J., dissenting); Shipman v. R.K.O.
Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938). The crystallization into distinct points
of inference occurred in Arnstein. See 154 F.2d at 468.
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Recognizing the inferential nature of the inquiry based on
circumstantial evidence, courts developed a sliding scale of proof
between the two points of inference, which came to be known as the
“inverse ratio rule.”16 Under this sliding scale approach, greater
evidence of access required lesser proof of similarity, and vice versa,
for a court to draw an inference of factual copying from the circumstances.17 In situations where the evidence showed a defendant to
have had unequivocal, easy, or extensive access to the plaintiff ’s
work, a lower degree of similarity was needed to infer factual
copying.18 Further, when the similarity between the works was
extensive, courts lowered the requisite amount of proof needed for
access, and at its extreme dispensed with looking for proof of access
altogether when the similarity was “striking.”19
Over time, this basic set of evidentiary rules needlessly generated
confusion in its application. Some courts misunderstood the very
nature of the circumstantial evidence inquiry and applied the
sliding scale erroneously to allow a lower level of improper appropriation, the second infringement prong, upon a showing of greater
proof of access.20 This confusion was undoubtedly caused by courts’
misunderstanding of the role of similarity in the two prongs of the
infringement test, a misunderstanding fueled by some courts’ use of
the term “substantial similarity” for both types of similarity.21
16. For the earliest judicial usage of the term, see Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63, 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also David Aronoff, Exploding the “Inverse Ratio Rule,” 55 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 125 (2008) (criticizing the rule). As we show later, Aronoff’s criticism was
erroneous.
17. See Morse, 127 F. Supp. at 66 (“[W]hen access is established a lesser degree of
similarity is required.”); Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The
inverse ratio rule provides that the stronger the evidence of access, the less compelling the
similarities between the two works need be in order to give rise to an inference of copying....
[and] the more compelling the similarities supporting an inference of copying, the less
compelling the evidence of access need be.”).
18. See Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.
19. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (“If the two
works are so strikingly similar as to preclude the possibility of independent creation, ‘copying’
may be proved without a showing of access.”).
20. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1172 (9th Cir. 1977); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 714
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“As defendants have conceded access to plaintiff ’s copyrighted illustration,
a somewhat lesser degree of similarity suffices to establish a copyright infringement than
might otherwise be required.”).
21. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172; Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 714. Professor Latman
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Whereas in establishing factual copying, the similarity was merely
to enable an inference of copying in improper appropriation it was
to judge the legality of such copying once factual copying was found
to exist. In a similar vein, some other courts thought it absurd that
the sliding scale could—in theory—allow a case to move forward
when there was no evidence of similarity at all but based entirely on
heightened proof of access—again without a fuller recognition of the
way in which the inference was meant to operate.22
The matter came to a head in 2020 when the Ninth Circuit issued
an en banc opinion in Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin “rejecting the
inverse ratio rule” and purporting to “join the majority of circuits”
that had already done so.23 Misperceiving the confusion and uncertainty that the rule had brought to the question as well as the
holdings of other circuits, the Ninth Circuit abrogated the inverse
ratio rule entirely.24 Some lawyers and copyright scholars have since
celebrated the Ninth Circuit’s repeal of the rule, reasoning that it
put to rest several decades of analytical inconsistency, which had
done little more than make it easier for copyright plaintiffs to
establish factual copying and move to the improper appropriation
prong of the infringement inquiry.25 Unfortunately, the Skidmore
decision and its advocates misunderstand the factual copying prong.
This Article shows that the rejection of the inverse ratio rule in
its entirety is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the
manner in which inferential proof and circumstantial evidence
operate. Unlike direct evidence, circumstantial evidence operates by
requiring the fact-finder to draw an inference from a fact that is

diagnosed the conflation problem and proposed use of the term “probative” similarity for the
assessment of similarity embodied in the factual copying prong. See Latman, supra note 11,
at 1188-91, 1204-11, 1214.
22. See, e.g., Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961).
23. 952 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
24. Id. at 1066-68.
25. See, e.g., Eileen McDermott, Ninth Circuit Alters Its Approach to Assessing Copyright
Infringement in Ruling for Led Zeppelin, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 9, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.
ipwatchdog.com/2020/03/09/ninth-circuit-alters-its-approach-to-assessing-copyright-infringe
ment-in-ruling-for-led-zeppelin/id=119710/ [https://perma.cc/54M7-WLVU] (noting how many
in the copyright community were pleased with the decision); Sarah Bro, Ninth Circuit Shows
Led Zeppelin a Whole Lotta Love in ‘Stairway’ Copyright Win, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-shows-led-zeppelin-whole-lotta-love-stair
way-copyright-win#google-vignette [https://perma.cc/5BYW-KRCE].
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contextually related to the conclusion sought.26 Being inferential in
nature, circumstantial evidence is therefore strongly tied to a probability or likelihood of a conclusion (rather than to a certainty).27
Central to such likelihood is the concept of probative value in
evidence law.28 Probative value refers to the degree to which a piece
of evidence makes a conclusion—through the inference—more or
less likely.29 Circumstantial proof of a conclusion works by combining inferences from a sequential chain of facts that can account for
the conclusion.30 Each of these facts and circumstances obviously
has a different probative value with regard to the final conclusion
being sought.31 Even when each is independent vis-à-vis the conclusion being proven, the probative values of the sequential facts
often depend on each other (referred to as “conditional probative
value”) reflecting the sequential and analytical logic underlying the
inferences themselves.32 When this occurs, the cumulative inference
towards the final conclusion derives from the combination of the
probative values of the individual facts presented as proof and the
inferences drawn from them.33 A fact that may be of minimal probative value on its own as an inference towards the conclusion may
thus gain significant probative value towards that same conclusion
in the presence of other facts.34 In other words, circumstantial proof
often depends on a combination of inferences from facts that may
each independently be of minimal probative value in isolation but
become more probative and possibly conclusive when assessed in
combination with the other facts.
26. See Latman, supra note 11, at 1192.
27. See id. at 1192-93, 1204.
28. Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 733, 734-35
(1986) (understanding probative value in terms of probability theory).
29. See id.
30. See ARTHUR P. WILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 464-65
(Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1896); ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A TREATISE ON THE NATURE,
PRINCIPLES, AND RULES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, ESPECIALLY THAT OF THE PRESUMPTIVE KIND, IN CRIMINAL CASES 156-68 (2d ed. 1859).
31. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 738-39.
32. The classical work recognizing this is Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative
Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MICH. L. REV. 439 (1994). For a critique, see Dale A.
Nance, Correspondence, Conditional Probative Value and the Reconstruction of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 419, 450-53 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Nance, supra note 32.
34. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 447-50.

308

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:299

It is this combinatorial approach to inferences and probative
value that explains the inverse ratio rule as a mechanism of circumstantial proof of actual copying. Access and similarity represent
sequential points of inference from the chain of behavior ordinarily
associated with copying. A defendant must have access to the
protected work, thereupon engage in an act of reproduction, thereby
resulting in the production of a copy that is similar. Thus, access
and similarity have their individual probative values conditionally
related to each other, and it is the strength of their combined
inference that allows a court to assess whether actual copying by the
defendant was more likely than not. By combining two circumstantial inference points (access and similarity), the law strengthens
inferential accuracy by allowing for the strength or weakness of one
to be offset by the other and vice versa. Thus emerges the inherent
logic behind the inverse ratio rule.
In a similar vein, the striking similarity variant of the rule
derives from related basic principles of circumstantial evidence.
Even though reluctant to permit courts to readily draw one inference entirely from another—known as the rule against “inference
upon inference”—evidence law permits such cascaded inferences to
be drawn when the strength of the evidence relating to the original
fact (from which the first inference is to be drawn) is sufficiently
robust, that is, tantamount to an actual fact.35 The striking similarity doctrine is little more than a mechanism of cascaded inferences
being used to prove copying. And in conformity with the working of
evidence principles, copyright law permits such proof only when the
evidence of similarity is so strong as to effectively eliminate all
possible alternate explanations for its existence.36
Therefore, copyright law’s inverse ratio rule, draws on common
intuitions embodied in the working of the fundamental principles of
inferential reasoning and evidence law. The Skidmore court was
inattentive in rejecting the rule in a misguided effort to raise the
bar for proving copying in a particular case. In so doing, the court
35. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 68-73 (1977); RICHARD
EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 35, 39-40, 237-40 (Robert Stevens, William
Twining & Christopher McCrudden eds., 2d ed. 1983).
36. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“If evidence of access is absent,
the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant
independently arrived at the same result.”).
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confused the nature of the inquiry and moved copyright law in the
Ninth Circuit away from a rational basis and common sense approach that has long been followed in other circuits. By examining
the briefing and oral argument, we trace how the court was misled
into reaching dubious logical conclusions and an astounding
misreading of out-of-circuit authority. The sliding scale approach to
proving copying continues to rule in other circuits, including the
Second Circuit, where it was first developed.37 Ironically then, the
rejection of the rule was mistaken both as a matter of analytical
logic as well as precedent—a surprising and troubling combination.
Much of the confusion surrounding the inverse ratio rule might
have been avoided if scholars—and courts—had simply paid attention to the manner in which the rules and principles of evidence
operate within copyright law as well as general principles of evidence law. While copyright is certainly a specialized domain with its
own statutory and nonstatutory prescriptions, copyright adjudication in federal courts ultimately relies on the transsubstantive
laws of procedure and evidence. Judges adjudicating copyright cases
would do well to ask whether, when, and how to deviate from those
rules when special considerations distinctive to copyright cases
arise but otherwise pay attention to the general and well-worn
precepts that apply across legal domains.
Part I unpacks the evidentiary logic underlying the inverse ratio
rule to show how it embodies a sensible analytical framework. This
framework is drawn from the operation of elemental principles of
evidence relating to circumstantial evidence. Part II traces the
origins of the inverse ratio rule and its evolution over the course of
the twentieth century leading up to its rejection by the Ninth Circuit in Skidmore. Part III then argues that the misunderstanding
of the inverse ratio rule was a result of copyright scholarship and
jurisprudence insufficiently engaging the law of evidence in thinking about the process through which infringement claims are adjudicated. Looking to other doctrinal puzzles in copyright adjudication

37. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Epic/Sony Recs., 351 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (“There is an
inverse relationship between access and probative similarity such that ‘the stronger the proof
of similarity, the less the proof of access is required.’” (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[D], at 13-77 (2002))).
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suggests that expressly considering evidence law considerations
holds valuable lessons for copyright law and case management.
I. THE EVIDENTIARY LOGIC OF THE INVERSE RATIO RULE
Distilled to its basics, copyright law’s inverse ratio rule posits an
inverse relationship between the strength of the evidence of a
defendant’s access to the protected work and the degree of similarity between the result of the defendant’s actions (namely, the
defendant’s copy) and the protected work. As one recent court
described it:
The inverse ratio rule provides that the stronger the evidence of
access, the less compelling the similarities between the two
works need be in order to give rise to an inference of copying. On
the flip side, the more compelling the similarities supporting an
inference of copying, the less compelling the evidence of access
need be. Indeed, if the similarities are “striking” enough—that
is, highly unlikely to have been the product of independent
creation—such similarities can be sufficient on their own to
establish that the defendant must have had access to the
plaintiff ’s work.38

As should be apparent, the inverse ratio rule operates as a mechanism of inference to show the existence of factual copying through
proof of circumstances that make such copying more likely than not.
While circumstantial evidence is today a common feature of adjudication, its core features are commonly overlooked. This Part
unpacks the evidentiary logic of the inverse ratio rule by situating
it within the working of circumstantial proof more generally. Section
A begins by disaggregating “copying” to show how copyright law’s
idea of factual copying embodies two separate epistemic dimensions.
Section B then uses the logic of circumstantial proof to show that
factual copying can be inferred from different circumstances that
occur along the sequence of events constitutive of such copying.
Section C introduces the idea of probative value and its conditional
nature to reveal how the interplay between two inference points
generates and justifies the inverse ratio rule.
38. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
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A. Copying as Act and Result
As the Supreme Court axiomatically declared more than half a
century ago, “[a]bsent copying, there can be no infringement of
copyright.”39 Given the centrality of the reproduction right to copyright, that statement remains largely true to this day.40 Proof of
copying—a factual question—is essential to a successful claim of
copyright infringement.41 Despite this reality, the nature of copying
as a factual question remains significantly underanalyzed.
When, as a factual matter, copyright law speaks of “copying” as
an essential component of infringement, that term connotes two
connected but nevertheless epistemically distinct ideas, each of
which is relevant to the law. The first idea is that the act of copying
must have taken place: the defendant must have engaged in actions
that are described as appropriative in nature, wherein expression
from the protected work was taken.42 The related second idea is that
the result of such copying must produce a copy: the act of copying
must result in the production of a copy of some aspects of the
copyrighted work.43 Both aspects underlie copyright law’s notion of
actual or factual copying, even though they are often seen as a
singular concept.
The act-dimension is encapsulated in the fundamental principle
that independent creation is a complete defense to infringement.44
Meaning, if the defendant is able to establish that the putative copy
was independently produced—that is, without any recourse to the
protected work—no infringement can exist. In other words, if the
39. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); see also Indep. Film Distrib., Ltd. v. Chesapeake Indus., Inc., 250 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1958); Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d
543, 548 (9th Cir. 1960); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741
(9th Cir. 1971); Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 672 (3d Cir.
1990); Murray Hill Pub’lns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 317 (6th
Cir. 2004).
40. See, e.g., Compulife Software Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020).
41. Id.
42. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
43. Id.
44. Feist Pub’lns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991); see also
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“[I]ndependent creation is a complete defense to copyright infringement.”); Design Basics, LLC v. Signature
Constr., Inc., 994 F.3d 879, 887 (7th Cir. 2021); Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117
(9th Cir. 2018).
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defendant’s expression was produced without the act of copying, for
example, through independent creation, there simply is no factual
copying.45
The result-dimension is, in turn, captured by the requirement
that the copying must produce a “copy” for it to amount to infringement.46 That copy must, in other words, comply with the law’s
fixation requirement.47 If a defendant engages in the act of appropriating expression from a protected work but the act does not
produce a copy that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression,
then factual copying does not exist. This is true regardless of how
extensive and clear the defendant’s act of appropriation itself is.
Furthermore, some courts require that the copied material be
copyright protected.48
Neither dimension is a mere formality; instead, they both go to
core normative ideas underlying the working of copyright. The
emphasis on independent creation is fundamental to the structure
of exclusivity that copyright law revolves around, which distinguishes it from patent law and renders it a wrong-based regime.49
Such independent creation is seen to inject a much-needed breathing space into the world of speech by ensuring that expression, even
when identical to protected content, is not unduly stifled.50 Indeed,
it is for this reason that some see independent creation and
copyright protection as two sides of the same coin.51

45. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1999)
(analyzing how as a logical matter independent creation and the act of copying are mutually
exclusive).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2022) (granting owners the exclusive right to “to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies”).
47. Id. § 101 (definition of “copies”).
48. This is primarily in the First Circuit, where the actual copying requirement is limited
to examining whether the defendant copied material from the work that is actually protected.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005).
49. For theoretical defenses of independent creation and its role in copyright, see
ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 57 (2015); Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1664, 1669 (2012); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1810-11 (2007).
50. For an autonomy-based defense of independent creation, which treats copyright
infringement without it as compelled speech, see DRASSINOWER, supra note 49, at 57.
51. Id.
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The rationale for copyright’s emphasis on the “copy” is of even
greater relevance to the evidentiary question. Liability for an unauthorized reproduction arises only when it results in a “copy.” A
defining feature of such a copy is that it must be fixed for more than
just a transitory period, meaning that the copy must subsist in a
“sufficiently permanent or stable” form.52 The purpose of this
fixation requirement, as scholars have long pointed out, is principally evidentiary.53 In situations where the copying does not result
in a fixation of the expression, courts are forced to rely exclusively
on descriptions (and testimony) of the copying as evidence, which is
cumbersome.54 By thus insisting that copying produce a copy, and
that definitionally such copy must be fixed, the law’s very idea of
copying (as a factual matter) embodies a crucial evidentiary dimension.
Rarely ever are the act- and result-dimensions of factual copying
disaggregated. All the same, unbundling them is critical to appreciating how factual copying is proven through the use of circumstantial evidence. When copyright law speaks of factual copying
as a prerequisite for infringement, it is insisting on proof of both the
act of copying as well as the result of such copying. This dual
meaning of copying obviously complicates the manner in which it is
to be proven in situations where there is no direct evidence (such as
an admission, video evidence, or eyewitness testimony) of the question. And it is from this dual meaning that the inverse ratio rule
emerges, when inferences are to be drawn from surrounding facts
to establish both aspects of copying.

52. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”).
53. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 730
(2003) (noting how the argument that fixation is “motivated by evidentiary concerns” is
widespread); Lydia Pallas Loren, Fixation as Notice in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 939,
959 (2016).
54. Loren, supra note 53, at 959 (describing the abuse this could result in); Tyler T. Ochoa,
Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, Or Does the Form(Gen) of the
Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 1024
(2004) (noting how because of fixation “[w]e don’t have to worry about copyright owners
infiltrating a private party in someone’s home or deposing the arranger’s family and friends
to obtain evidence of copyright infringement”).
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B. Inferring Factual Copying
Circumstantial evidence, often referred to as indirect evidence, is
evidence of facts or circumstances that are related to the fact
intended to be proven, from which that fact can be inferred.55 The
fact to be proven is often referred to as the probandum or “principal
fact” and the facts or circumstances that are proven and from which
the principal fact can be inferred are called the “evidentiary facts.”56
What sets circumstantial evidence apart is the reality that the move
from evidentiary facts to the principal fact is one of inference rather
than proof.
Inference is an “intermediate process of reasoning,” one that
entails rational judgment.57 This is certainly not to suggest that it
is subjective in nature but rather that it is a matter of belief rather
than knowledge. The inferences underlying circumstantial evidence
are drawn from common human experience and recurring patterns
of behavior, cause-effect, and correlation seen in practice, which
strengthen (or weaken) one’s belief.58 Circumstantial evidence thus
entails inference from one fact to another; all the same, the nature
of the connection between such facts follows a finite set of patterns.
One leading nineteenth-century treatise on circumstantial evidence
classified the relationship into three general categories: “causes,”
“concomitants,” and “effects.”59 Although somewhat imprecise, the
classification captures the sequenced nature of the inferential
process relating to an occurrence, proof of which is being sought.
The term “causes” captures the set of background conditions that
make the fact to be proven more likely to occur. The category
should, however, be understood to encompass not just causes in the
strict sense but also antecedent conditions that make the occurrence
55. See WILL, supra note 30, at 15; WILLIAM WILLS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CIR19 (Alfred Wills ed., 6th ed. 1912); ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A TREATISE ON THE NATURE, PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, ESPECIALLY
THAT OF THE PRESUMPTIVE KIND, IN CRIMINAL CASES 4 (N.Y.C., Baker, Voorhis, & Co. 1868).
56. BURRILL, supra note 55, at 5-6.
57. Id. at 5; see also WILLIAM WILLS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATED BY NUMEROUS CASES 15-16 (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson, 3d London ed.
1853) (pointing out how such reasoning is generally absent in situations involving direct evidence, where intuition is at play).
58. BURRILL, supra note 55, at 12-22.
59. Id. at 13-14.
CUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
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likely, even if they did not “cause” it in a strict legal sense. A good
example is a motive for an action. While a motive is certainly not a
cause of an action, it nevertheless informs the set of circumstances
making the action likely and is in that sense circumstantially
relevant.60 “Concomitants” refers to facts with a cause common to
the occurrence to be proven, such that the presence of one allows an
inference of the other. The possession of a rare bottle of poison,
when the same poison was used in a crime, is a good example here.
This is probably the most expansive category of inferential proof.
Finally, the category of “effects” covers the results of the occurrence,
regardless of whether they are legally consequential. The “smoking
gun” is an obvious example of this category, in as much as the idiom
conveys an example of a weapon used in a crime showing signs of
immediate prior use, that is, the smoke being the result of the
weapon having just been fired.61
Returning to the act of copying from a work, we can break down
the sequence of events constitutive of copying into relatively discrete components. To begin with, copying from a protected work
requires the copier to have an awareness of the protected work.
With such awareness of the work, the copier then engages in an act
of appropriation that entails physically replicating some aspect of
the protected work. And finally, the appropriation results in an
outward manifestation, which is the copy itself. As should be obvious, each of these discrete components lines up with the individual
categories of inference commonly deployed for circumstantial proof
of copying.
Being aware of the work is a necessary condition for copying to
have taken place. And the best objective manifestation of such
awareness is proof of the defendant’s access to the work. While
access does not, of course, conclusively establish that the defendant
was aware of the work, it nevertheless makes it more probable that
this was in fact the case. Evidence of facts that occurred in parallel
60. For a general account of motives and emotions as evidence of conditions in the law,
see 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 416 (James H. Chadbourn ed.,
1979); see also David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
439, 439-40 (2001).
61. See H.C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 215-16 (3d ed.
1923) (offering the example of a “smoking pistol” as circumstantial proof of a killing based on
result).
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with the defendant’s appropriative behavior generate an inference
of such behavior having taken place. Such concomitant evidence is
particularly difficult to come by, especially in situations where the
artifacts deployed by the defendant for the appropriation (for example, copying equipment) are not limited to the act of copying the
protected work. All the same, it is conceivable that such evidence
could exist. An example might be a defendant’s ownership of a
unique copying device that is shown to have been used in the
replication/appropriation.62 Finally, evidence of the result of such
copying—which lies in the production of the copy—is seen in the
similarity between the protected work and the defendant’s copy.
This parallelism is illustrated in the table below.
Table: Points of Circumstantial Inference in Factual Copying
Nature of
Inference

Component of Factual
Copying

Point of Circumstantial
Inference

Condition

Awareness of the
protected work

Proof of access

Concomitant

Replicating content in the
protected work

Evidence of appropriative
behavior

Result

Creation of a copy

Similarity between copy
and protected work

It is crucial to recognize that despite there being a sequence of
events underlying factual copying that corresponds to the commonly deployed categories of inference, as an analytical matter each
point of inference operates independently. In other words, each element of proof—be it a condition, concomitant, or result—is capable
on its own of generating an inference as to the fact meant to be
proven, that is, factual copying.63 Now it may well be that in practice
62. An example here might be a reproduction carried out by a defendant in his own unique
handwriting, which can be identified as originating in the defendant.
63. For an early recognition of this reality, see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d
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the strength of each individual inference is too weak to stand on its
own; yet, that does not impact the analytical logic of each point of
inference. In other words, as a matter of pure logic and deduction,
evidence of antecedent conditions (access) directly generates an
inference of factual copying, as does evidence of result (similarity).
This point is easy to overlook in light of the sequenced nature of the
inference points. Yet, what it means is that proof of factual copying
that relies on circumstantial evidence does not—as a matter of pure
deductive logic—necessitate points of inference from all three categories/types. Instead, one or more will often dominate the inferential process depending on context.
We now turn to the connection between the dual meaning of
copying that the law adopts and the working of inference points.
Because the law’s understanding of copying even as a factual matter
means both the act of copying (appropriation) as well as its result
(the copy), it implicitly demands that both dimensions be proven by
a plaintiff seeking to establish factual copying. Consequently, even
though as a purely analytical matter each of the three potential
points of inference involving copying (that is, condition/concomitant/
result) is able to generate a likelihood that copying occurred, the
law’s dual meaning of copying now accords inference from result a
special place and thus independent salience. As a purely logical
matter, therefore, each of the three potential points of inference was
independently sufficient to establish copying while none was individually necessary; the law alters this in relation to similarity,
which it makes independently necessary. Without evidence of similarity, copyright law refuses to allow an inference of factual copying
even when alternative bases for that inference may exist.64
Very importantly, this insistence on the inference being drawn
from the similarity is not the same as requiring that similarity be
shown to exist as an independent component of the analysis.65 For
Cir. 1946) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence—usually evidence of access—from which the trier of
the facts may reasonably infer copying.”).
64. Id. (“Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice
to prove copying.”). Arnstein did not, of course, offer a fuller explanation for this rationale. All
the same, it is worth noting that under the Copyright Act of 1909, which contained the
relevant law at the time, the creation of a “copy” was already considered integral to a finding
of infringement. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1908)
(finding there to be no infringement when no copy was made of the work).
65. For an effort to advance this idea, see 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:91
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the latter to hold true, it would have to be established based on an
independent preponderance of evidence, that is, more probable than
not. Instead, the law merely requires that some similarity exist so
as to be part of the circumstantial proof that generates the inference
of copying.66 In other words, similarity needs to merely be a point of
inference.
Circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s appropriative behavior
has historically been rare, and therefore, courts have almost never
placed significant reliance on this factor to draw their inferences.
Somewhat recently, however, this category has been implicitly rejuvenated in infringement lawsuits involving internet downloads,
where a defendant’s act of copying is inferred from their ownership
and use of a computer with a unique identification (IP address) that
is shown to have been used in the copying.67 Courts have become
increasingly willing to accept such evidence as circumstantially
sufficient for proof of copying when combined, of course, with the
existence of an identical (or similar) copy.68
In short then, the basic precepts of circumstantial evidence carry
over rather seamlessly to the proof of factual copying, with the one
all-important modification noted previously relating to inference
from similarity. Courts typically infer factual copying from two or
more points: the similarity of the copy (to the original) and additional evidence that goes to show the existence of relevant background conditions to the copying (access) or proof of the defendant
having engaged in the replication involved (appropriative behavior).
(2022).
66. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (“If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then
the trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove
copying.”).
67. This generally occurs in what are known as BitTorrent copyright infringement
lawsuits, involving the use of BitTorrent streams that allow a data file to be broken down into
innumerable packets and then downloaded. Plaintiffs in these cases identified unique IP
(Internet Protocol) addresses that were used for the downloads and then initiated
infringement lawsuits against the owners of these addresses with the inference that the
owners had themselves engaged in the downloads. See Sean B. Karunaratne, Note, The Case
Against Combating BitTorrent Piracy Through Mass John Doe Copyright Infringement
Lawsuits, 111 MICH. L. REV. 283, 284-85 (2012); Stefan Mentzer & Michael La Marca, Joinder
and Early Discovery in BitTorrent Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 89, 89-91 (2015).
68. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Ling, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1242 (D. Colo. 2015);
Malibu Media, LLC v. Flanagan, No. 2:13-CV-5890, 2014 WL 2957701, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July
1, 2014).
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When this occurs, factual copying is said to have been established
through circumstantial evidence.
C. The Similarity-Access Relationship
As understood today, the inverse ratio rule to prove copying embodies three interrelated propositions: (1) weak evidence of access
may be compensated for by greater similarity, (2) minimal similarity between the works may be offset by strong evidence of access,
and (3) extensive similarity may at times allow a court to dispense
with proof of access altogether, while the opposite is not permitted,
that is, access without any similarity is fatal to the question of
copying.69 Propositions (1) and (2) identify an inverse inferential
relationship between the evidence of similarity and access, while (3)
in turn takes that inverse relationship further and allows for one
inference to be drawn from another, but only ever in one direction.70
Each of these ideas has strong and hitherto unappreciated foundations in the principles of evidence law, which this Section
develops.
1. Probative Value and Probability
Central to the law of evidence is the basic principle of “probative
value,” which is understood as “[t]he degree to which one fact tends
to make probable another posited fact.”71 It is thus seen as a
fundamentally “relational concept” and as describing the “strength
with which evidence supports an inference to a given conclusion.”72
Unlike the legal concept of relevance, which is a binary concept in
evidence law—that is, a piece of evidence is either relevant or
irrelevant, with no middle ground—probative value is a question of
degree and as such requires the exercise of the fact-finder’s judgment.73 The probative value of a piece of evidence is therefore a
69. For a concise statement of all three propositions, see Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883
F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
70. See id. at 1117.
71. Probative Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
72. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models
of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 108 n.2 (2007).
73. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
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function of “how much” the evidence makes a particular explanation
more (or less) likely.74
In the conventional view, the probative value of a piece of
evidence is measured using what is known as the “likelihood ratio,”
which relies on probability theory and integrates it with the manner
in which a fact-finder’s belief structure operates.75 The likelihood
ratio for a piece of evidence (E) in establishing a proposition/
conclusion (C) is the ratio of the probability of that conclusion given
the evidence, P(E|C) to the probability of the opposite (or|negation)
of that conclusion given the same evidence, P(E|not C).76 This is
often mathematically represented as: Probative Value (PV) = P(E|C)
: P(E|not C).77
As should be obvious from this understanding of probative value,
the probability of an event having occurred given the evidence in
question, that is, P(E|C), directly influences the probative value of
that piece of evidence.78 Or put another way, as the probability of
the event having occurred given the evidence increases, so does the
probative value. Returning to copyright law’s rules relating to proof
of copying reveals how this might work.
Insofar as the proposition/conclusion sought to be established is
actual copying, the law—as we have seen—identifies two independent points of inference for that conclusion to be reached circumstantially: access and similarity. Consider access first. Evidence of
access may include evidence that the defendant heard (or saw) the
protected musical work once, prior to the alleged act of copying.79
74. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 12, at 156 (2d ed. 1923); see also Friedman, supra note 32, at 444.

75. The classical exposition in the realm of evidence law is Richard O. Lempert, Essay,
Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1977). For more literature on the likelihood
ratio, see VIC BARNETT, COMPARATIVE STATISTICAL INFERENCE 306 (1999); David H. Kaye,
Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and a Pair of Shoes, 53 JURIMETRICS 1, 3 (2012); David H. Kaye,
Digging into the Foundations of Evidence Law, Review, 115 MICH. L. REV. 915, 923 (2017)
(reviewing MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
EVIDENCE LAW (2016)); David H. Kaye, Quantifying Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 761, 763
(1986). See generally Anders Nordgaard & Birgitta Rasmusson, The Likelihood Ratio as Value
of Evidence—More than a Question of Numbers, 11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 303 (2012);
Louis Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1
(2014).
76. See Lempert, supra note 75, at 1025.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1025-26.
79. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 1, at 802.
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Alternately, it may consist of evidence that the defendant heard the
protected musical work fifty times, ascertained on the basis of
digital records.80 A basic understanding of probability tells us that
the probability of copying given a single hearing is less than the
probability of copying given multiple hearings; and conversely that
the probability of no copying with multiple hearings reduces in
comparison to the probability of no copying with a single hearing.
Consequently, evidence of access based on hearing a work fifty times
is of greater probative value than evidence of access based on a
single hearing, to the question of actual copying.81 The stronger the
evidence of access, the greater is its probative value to actual
copying.82
The same is true of similarity: a 10 percent expressive similarity
between the content of two literary works has a lower probability of
being the result of copying, and is thus of less probative value than
a situation where the expressive similarity is 85 percent. When the
two works are identical, that is, when their similarity is 100 percent, the probability of it having resulted from copying is at its
highest and the probative value of such evidence is therefore at its
highest.83
2. Conditional Probative Value and the Combinatorial
Approach to Inference
Probative value is a question of the degree to which a piece of
evidence makes a conclusion more plausible. All the same, the
probative value of a piece of evidence under certain circumstances
also embodies a conditional property.84 Known as “conditional probative value” (an offshoot of “conditional relevance”85), the idea is
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See, e.g., id. at 795, 802; Lempert, supra note 75, at 1025.
82. See Balganesh, supra note 1, at 795, 805.
83. See Lempert, supra note 75, at 1025-26. Of course, this is short of there being evidence
(from the defendant, usually) that both works originated in a common source or material that
was not original to the protected work alone.
84. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 447.
85. For early identifications of the idea of conditional relevance, see EDMUND M. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 45 (1962). See generally Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance
Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447 (1990). Conditional relevance today finds itself in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). For criticism of the idea, see generally
Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435 (1980); Ronald J.
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that the probative value of some kinds of evidence is entirely contextual and depends on proof of a predicate condition.86 When the
predicate condition is introduced and proven, the proffered evidence has greater probative value than it does in situations where
that predicate is altogether absent.87 An example of conditional probative value comes from the evidentiary rules relating to authentication.88 Under these rules, a piece of evidence gains probative
value—and is admissible—only upon proof that it is what its
proponent claims it to be.89 Thus, a letter purporting to contain a
defendant’s acknowledgement of a matter is of probative value only
if it can be shown to have been written by the defendant. If it is
shown to have originated in someone other than the defendant, the
letter loses probative value in relation to the defendant’s admission
and its consequences.90 The probative value of the proffered fact (the
letter) is conditional upon proof of the predicate fact (its having been
written by the defendant).91
In short then, the idea of conditional probative value recognizes
the existence of a relationship between two facts. Now, each of those
facts might have its own probative value, with each entailing an
inference. In other words, establishing a predicate fact is likely to
itself be a matter of its own probative value.92 And when this occurs,
the probative value of the predicate fact interacts with—and influences—the probative value of the proffered fact.93 To illustrate this
with our earlier example involving an authentication: establishing
Allen, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 871 (1992).
86. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 447; Richard D. Friedman, Correspondence: Reply,
Refining Conditional Probative Value, 94 MICH. L. REV. 457, 458 (1995); Dale A. Nance,
Correspondence, Conditional Probative Value and the Reconstruction of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 419, 419 (1995). The Supreme Court, too, has endorsed the idea
in principle. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997) (“The probative worth
of any particular bit of evidence is obviously affected by the scarcity or abundance of other
evidence on the same point.” (quoting 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5250, at 546-47 (1978))).
87. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 458.
88. FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an
item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.”).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 458.
92. See id. at 454-55.
93. See id. at 454.
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that the letter was written by the defendant is itself likely to be a
matter of proof and thus carry its own probative value.94 A factfinder might be presented with a defendant’s other letters to carry
out a comparison of the handwriting. Thus, proof of this fact—that
is, that the letter was written by the defendant—is invariably a
probabilistic assessment involving an inference, which in turn
influences the probative value of the letter on the question of it
representing a defendant’s acknowledgment.
The more complicated—and relevant for our purposes—question
is the proof required to establish a predicate fact, which in turn
informs the probative value of the proffered fact. As generally understood, the predicate fact must be accompanied by proof “sufficient to support a finding” that it exists.95 While this sufficiency,
which corresponds to its probative value, may seem to be an
independent variable, in practice it is intricately tied to the nature
of the proffered fact.96 In some situations, the proffered fact is of low
probative value on its own, such that the proof of the predicate fact
needs to be high. Examples include communications and messages
that are taken to require a “greater degree of authentication.”97 On
the other hand, some documents—described as “self-authenticating”—are produced and created in a manner that accords them
higher probative value on their own, and accordingly a significantly
lesser degree proof is demanded of the predicate fact.98
In many situations involving interrelated facts, the line between
predicate and proffered fact is often unclear. In other words, there
might well be situations where two facts, both of which are offered as proof of a proposition, reinforce each other such that each of
their probative values is conditional on the other.99 It is this form of
94. See id. at 451-52.
95. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
96. See Nance, supra note 85, at 450.
97. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011); State v. Jones, 318 P.3d 1020
(Kan. Ct. App. 2014); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
98. FED. R. EVID. 902 (listing evidence that is self-authenticating).
99. Indeed, the earliest identification of a conditional relationship between two pieces of
evidence identified this. MORGAN, supra note 85, at 45-46 (“I[t] often happens that upon an
issue as to the existence of fact C, a combination of facts A and B will be highly relevant but
that either without the other will have no relevance.”); see also Nance, supra note 85, at 449
(“In such situations, the basic requirement of relevance means that the admissibility of
evidence of either fact A or fact B must be conditioned upon some form of showing of the
other.”).
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two-directional conditionality that is at the heart of the two inference points commonly used to prove actual copying.100 In these
situations, the “sufficien[cy]” of proof required to establish each fact
needs to be understood in the aggregate, rather than as attaching
to each individual fact.101 The evidence of each fact “must be considered together with other evidence that pertains to the ultimate
proposition.”102 Thus, while each fact in isolation might be of weak
probative value when considered individually, when taken in combination together, their probative value increases dramatically
because they each operate as the predicate for the other.103 And
owing to this combinatorial approach to such conditionally related
facts, a higher probative value on one allows for a lower probative
value on the other, and vice versa.104
This combinatorial approach has long been understood as the
established method of understanding how different elements of circumstantial evidence work together in service of a final conclusion.
One nineteenth-century treatise on circumstantial evidence described the approach as follows:
A single isolated fact or circumstance might be no evidence; two
or three more taken together might not make evidence in the eye
of the law; but a multitude of slight facts taken together as true
might make evidence that would warrant a jury in finding a
verdict of guilty in the most serious cases....
....
It is not true, however, that each and every of the minor
circumstances introduced to sustain these ultimate facts must
be proven with the same degree of certainty. Some of these
circumstances may fail of proof altogether, and be discarded
from consideration by the jury, yet the ultimate fact to establish
which they were presented may be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt.105
100. See MORGAN, supra note 85, at 45-46.
101. Nance, supra note 85, at 450 (noting how one piece of evidence “together with the
other evidence” can satisfy the condition).
102. Id. at 451.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. WILL, supra note 30, at 463, 465-66.
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Metaphors commonly used to describe this combinatorial approach
include a cable with multiple strands, some of which are weak, yet
the cable as a whole remains strong in the aggregate, or a “bundle
of rods.”106
Further, the combinatorial approach looks not just to the “number” of individual circumstances from which inferences are to be
drawn but also to the “weight” (or strength) of the inferences that
may be drawn therefrom, recognizing that in the sequence, not all
individual inferences are likely to be of equal strength.107 Such
“weight” is a crucial consideration since it is the aggregate that
matters in proving the ultimate question, thus allowing for a weak
inference from one circumstance to be offset by a stronger one from
another, when each fact/circumstance is “independent” of the
other.108 Another leading treatise on circumstantial evidence described this mechanism as follows:
The weight of the individual circumstances ... is constantly found
to vary in every combination presented by evidence; some facts
affording only a slight presumption of the truth of the hypothesis; others, that stronger degree which is sufficient to establish
it, unless weakened, rebutted, or destroyed by opposing facts;
others, more rarely, reaching that high grade of efficacy denominated conclusiveness.... The most common application of the
epithet “conclusive,” is to the final effect of a number of facts
taken together, and constituting a body of evidence; producing a
degree of persuasion or assurance.109

An example illustrates the idea. Assume that in a civil trial for
the action of wrongful death (rather than a criminal murder trial),
the plaintiff seeks to establish that the defendant caused the death
of the victim. Focusing on a civil claim allows us to set the appropriate standard of proof as the preponderance of evidence, which is the
standard used in copyright infringement claims that are civil in
nature.110 Among other evidence, the plaintiff ’s case contains three
106. Id. at 466.
107. BURRILL, supra note 30, at 156.
108. Id. at 156, 159.
109. Id. at 160.
110. For an interesting overview of the two standards and their coevolution, see John
Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil Proof, 67 FLA. L.

326

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:299

pieces of circumstantial evidence: (a) the cause of the victim’s death
was a gunshot wound (cause of death), (b) the defendant was
present in the same room as the victim at the time of death
(presence), and (c) the defendant holds a valid handgun permit
(permit). The probative values of each of these three facts, in
relation to the conclusion (that the defendant caused the death by
gunshot), are interrelated, such that while each is a proffered fact
for that conclusion, each also operates as a predicate fact to support
the probative value of the others. Absent proof of the cause of death,
the permit and presence are of minimal probative value; absent the
permit, the cause of death and presence are of lower value in tying
the defendant to the death; and absent the defendant’s presence, the
mere existence of a permit and the cause of death are similarly of
lower value. The three facts reinforce each other to build a combined
narrative.
Now, if the proof of one of these three facts is weak, say, the
defendant’s presence in the room, it can be offset by greater evidence of the other components of the narrative—as long as the
combination is sufficiently robust to draw the appropriate inference
towards the conclusion. Weak proof of the defendant’s physical
presence (for example, a partial footprint) when combined with
strong evidence of the permit (for example, a permit for a specific
type of gun) and the cause of death (for example, the gunshot having
come from a specific gun) generates the same combined inference.111
This is the basic logic behind the combinatorial approach to circumstantial evidence.
This allows us to now make sense of the central idea behind the
inverse ratio rule. Proof of access and similarity between the works
each independently operates as a proffered fact to establish the
legal conclusion of actual copying.112 At the same time, each also
REV. 1569 (2015); see also Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979
(1993) (providing an overview of the criminal standard of proof and its working in the
appellate process); Mark Schweizer, The Civil Standard of Proof—What Is It, Actually?, 20
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 217, 217-19 (2016); Kevin M. Clermont, Death of Paradox: The Killer
Logic Beneath the Standards of Proof, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1065-67, 1087 (2013).
111. For an account of different types of circumstantial evidence that might be combined
together in a narrative to establish a core proposition, see 1 WIGMORE, supra note 74, § 43,
at 263.
112. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13D.08[B][2],
at 13D-75 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2022).
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operates as a predicate fact for the other such that one without the
other is ordinarily of insufficient probative value on the ultimate
conclusion, that is, copying.113 When both are present, it is the
sufficiency of their combination that is relevant for the purposes of
that conclusion.114 Now, if proof of one is weak, the focus on the
combination asks what it is to be combined with to generate a
sufficiently robust putative inference pertaining to the conclusion.115
Because the law allows only two principal points of inference on
circumstantial proof of copying (access and similarity), the robustness of that inference cannot come from other pieces of circumstantial proof.116 It must instead simply come from the other (of the
two).117 And this is what is meant by the requirement that weakness
of proof relating to one (access or similarity) can be offset by strong
evidence of the other—so as to render the combined inference as to
the ultimate fact sufficiently robust.118
Thus, if a plaintiff is able to establish no more than that the
defendant was a member of a library that owned the protected work,
this fact (of access) is of minimal probative value to the question of
copying unless there is some similarity between the defendant’s
copy and the protected work. Now, if that similarity is significant—assume 70 percent—the extent of that similarity offsets the
weak evidence of access so as to allow for a combined inference of
actual copying. On the other hand, if the two works show a minimal
amount of similarity—say 10 percent—that evidence is on its own
of limited probative value unless accompanied by proof that the
defendant had significant access to the protected work. If the
plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant specifically owned a
copy of the work and kept it in his personal library or if the library
records reveal that the defendant specifically borrowed the library
copy of the plaintiff ’s work, that fact enhances the probative value
of the similarity in combination and allows for an inference of
copying.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. § 13D.08[C][4][b], at 13D-82-83.
See id. § 13D.08[B][2], at 13D-75.
See id. § 13D.08[C][4][b], at 13D-82-83.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In short then, the probative value of each of access and similarity
is conditional on proof of the other such that their combined probative value—which is the only one that matters—is stronger than
the probative value of the weaker of the two and sufficient to
support the inference as to copying.119 Of course, it need not be the
case that one is weaker and the other stronger; it might well be that
each is of independently sufficient probative value so as to produce
a robust inference in the aggregate.120 The inverse ratio rule merely
makes room for the possibility when this is not present, and thus
does little more than emphasize the combinatorial approach to
probative value.121
3. Cascaded Inferences from Similarity
The combinatorial approach accounts for the core of the inverse
ratio rule, which allows for a sliding scale of proof on the two main
points of inference needed to establish factual copying through
circumstantial evidence.122 It does not on its own, however, account
for the allowance that the law makes—as an extreme application of
the inverse ratio rule—for situations where the fact-finder is presented with no proof of access but overwhelming evidence of
similarity. In these situations, referred to as situations of “striking
similarity,” the law allows the fact-finder to make a finding of
factual copying directly, disregarding the absence of evidence
relating to access.123
Thus, hypothetically, if a defendant produces a novel that is
identical (that is, 100 percent similar) to the plaintiff ’s protected
original work and does not point to a common prior source for such
similarity, the plaintiff will need to do no more than establish such
similarity for a fact-finder to conclude that the defendant had copied
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. § 13D.08[B][2], at 13D-75.
123. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (“In some cases, the
similarities between the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s work are so extensive and striking as,
without more ... to justify an inference of copying.”); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d
350, 356 (4th Cir. 2001); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988); Baxter v.
MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987); Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113
(5th Cir. 1978).
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from the plaintiff. It is of no consequence that the plaintiff is unable
to present any evidence that the defendant had access to the
novel.124 On the face of things, this may seem like little more than
a mathematically reductive application of the main inverse ratio
rule (that is, moving the ratio from 80:20 to 100:0).125 In actuality,
however, it does something very different and derives from principles of evidence pertaining to inferences.
Recall that in the traditional formulation, the facts of access and
similarity are in combination capable of generating an inference of
factual copying.126 They each generate an independent inference
that when combined together suffices as proof of copying.127 All the
same, when one element (access or similarity) is absent but proof
on the other is significant, things are different.128 In these situations, the principles of evidence law recognize that there are
circumstances under which the absence of a fact can be compensated for by an additional inference from an existing fact, if the
evidence of that fact allows for it.129
Commonly referred to as situations of “inference upon inference,”
these are situations where the law allows a chain of inferences to be
drawn sequentially from one single fact under appropriate circumstances.130 Although courts initially developed a norm against
drawing one inference from another in trials, the crystallization of
this norm into a rule precluding sequential inferences was soon met
with significant criticism. Wigmore, in his influential treatise, laid
this out rather directly:

124. But see Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that even under
the striking similarity doctrine, other circumstantial evidence of access must always be
present). Later courts have read Selle to imply that such access must be present when there
is a suspicion of a common prior source, which the court was unable to rule out in that case.
See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997) (“What troubled us
in Selle ... is that two works may be strikingly similar—may in fact be identical—not because
one is copied from the other but because both are copies of the same thing in the public
domain.”).
125. For a misunderstanding along these lines, see Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186,
187 (2d Cir. 1961).
126. See supra Part I.C.2.
127. See supra Part I.C.2.
128. See supra Part I.C.2.
129. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 13D.08[B][2], at 13D-75-76.
130. See generally LAURENCE JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 71
(1977).
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It was once suggested that an “inference upon an inference” will
not be permitted, i.e. that a fact desired to be used circumstantially must itself be established by testimonial evidence; and this
suggestion has been repeated by a few Courts, and sometimes
actually enforced. There is no such rule; nor can be. If there
were, hardly a single trial could be adequately prosecuted. For
example, on a charge of murder, the defendant’s gun is found
discharged; from this we infer that he discharged it; and from
this we infer that it was his bullet which struck and killed the
deceased. Or, the defendant is shown to have been sharpening
a knife; from this we argue that he had a design to use it upon
the deceased; and from this we argue that the fatal stab was the
result of this design. In these and innumerable daily instances
we build up inference upon inference, and yet no Court ever
thought of forbidding it. All departments of reasoning, all
scientific work, every day’s life and every day’s trials, proceed
upon such data.131

Following Wigmore, most courts have since moved away from a
strong prohibition on such inferences—often described as “cascaded
inferences”—and replaced it instead with a variety of more nuanced
approaches.132 In one, courts demand greater proof of the initial fact
from which the multiple inferences are generated; in another, they
demand that the first inference be sufficiently robust; and in yet
another, they insist that multiple inferences are permitted as long
as they are not remote, speculative, conjectural, or tenuous.133 In
any event, courts have developed various doctrinal mechanisms to
regulate the use of cascaded inferences.
Returning to proof of copying, in situations where the similarity
is extensive but there is no proof of access, the law is ready to find
copying not because it dispenses with proof of access altogether (or
renders it irrelevant). Instead, it does so because that initial fact—
that is, the extensive similarity—is seen to be of sufficiently robust
probative value on its own to also generate an additional inference
131. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 74, § 41, at 258-60 (footnotes omitted).
132. See, e.g., David A. Schum & Anne W. Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on
Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105, 106 (1982) (“A cascaded
inference ... is composed of one or more reasoning stages interposed between evidence
observable to the fact finder and the ultimate facts-in-issue.”).
133. 29 AM. JUR. 2D EVIDENCE § 214, at 254-56, Westlaw (database updated May 2022)
(identifying these methods and the case law deploying each of them).
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of access. And that inference of access, when combined with the
proof of similarity, allows the court to infer the existence of copying.134 Copying is thus inferred from the proof of similarity, the fact
of which also generates an inference of access. The inference (of
copying) is thus cascaded upon the inference of access and the fact
of similarity. And to permit this cascade of inferences, copyright law
holds the foundational fact (of similarity) to a higher standard,
demanding that it be so strong as to rule out all other alternative
explanations, tantamount to a beyond reasonable doubt standard.135
A few astute courts have recognized the existence of this cascaded
effect, in puzzling over the reasons why the law dispenses with proof
of access under certain circumstances. For instance, Chief Judge
Posner in one case allowed for an inference of copying from similarity even in the absence of proof of access on the recognition that the
process of “inference” was predicated on the recognition that “a
similarity that is so close as to be highly unlikely to have been an
accident of independent creation is evidence of access.”136
Crucial to an inference from another inference is a reality that
must not be forgotten: the sequence of events. One inference may be
appropriately drawn from another only ever when the sequence of
events in the chain allows for it. It is for this very reason that the
converse of the situation outlined above does not hold true: the law
does not infer copying from a heightened proof of access when there
is no similarity.137 However strong the proof of it may be, mere access cannot generate an inference of similarity because in the sequence of events access as a condition is antecedent to similarity,
which is in turn a result.138 Hence, a natural corollary to the inverse
ratio rule is that the absence of similarity is fatal to a circumstantial inference of copying even when the proof of access is extensive.
As we shall see, innumerable courts have missed the basic logic of

134. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 13D.08[B][2], at 13D-75.
135. See, e.g., Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the
standard to be used is that the similarity at issue must have “preclude[d] any reasonable
possibility of independent creation” in order for the inference to be drawn (alteration in
original)).
136. Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997).
137. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
138. See supra Part I.B.
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cascaded inferences and in the process mistakenly cast unwarranted
doubt on the very idea behind the inverse ratio rule.139
Now, it might be argued that even if the logical sequence of
events does not permit an inference of similarity from proof of
access, the law should altogether dispense with the need for similarity in such situations and infer copying directly from proof of access.
To see why this is problematic, we return to the dual meaning of
copying in copyright.140 Recall that in copyright law, copying is both
an act and a result. And although access might well produce an
adequate inference of copying as an act, it sheds little light on the
result—that is, there needing to be a copy. Copyright law’s allowance for an inference upon another inference in one direction but not
the other (that is, from similarity to access and copying, but not in
the opposite direction) is borne out of both logical considerations
internal to the nature of the inference as well as the law’s very
meaning of copying.
***
In summary then, each of the components of the inverse ratio rule
derives from well-accepted principles of evidence law and basic logic.
The sliding scale of proof between access and similarity originates
in the combinatorial approach to sufficiency and the idea of conditional probative value. The corollary to the sliding scale—the
striking similarity rule—similarly derives from the principle of
cascaded inferences, which also introduces a crucial limit into that
corollary and limits its working to one direction. Despite this reality,
innumerable courts have struggled to make sense of the rule, often
being misled by lawyers (and possibly some scholars) casting doubt
on its soundness for strategic reasons.

139. See, e.g., Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961) (noting that a logical
extension of the inverse ratio rule is that it should allow copying to be proved when the proof
of access is near-certain but there is no similarity between the works, which is clearly not
permitted).
140. See supra Part I.A.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INVERSE RATIO RULE
Ever since its origins, copyright law has understood infringement—originally referred to as “piracy”—as revolving around copying.141 As one early treatise put it, “[c]opying or borrowing from a
protected work is an essential element of piracy.”142 Proof of copying thus became a critical part of infringement adjudication,
wherein a court had to determine whether the defendant’s actions
constituted a violation of one or more of the exclusive rights granted
to the proprietor/author of copyright in the work. Copying came to
be juxtaposed against the use of commonly available preexisting
material, from which the defendant might have produced a similar
work, an idea that came to be understood as the act of “independent
creation.”143 Copying and independent creation developed as binary
alternatives around which the wrong of infringement turned.
In an overwhelming majority of early reported decisions, defendants routinely contested allegations of copying by suggesting that
they had labored independently to produce an original work of their
own.144 In each of these cases, courts therefore began looking for a
workable mechanism with which to differentiate between copying
and independent creation based on surrounding circumstances.
Similarity—between the works—became the principal piece of
circumstantial evidence in this regard.145 One nineteenth-century
copyright law treatise thus observed:

141. See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS, DRAMUSICAL COMPOSITIONS, LETTERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS, ENGRAVINGS AND
SCULPTURE AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA; WITH SOME NOTICES
OF THE HISTORY OF LITERARY PROPERTY 242-44 (Boston, C.C. Little & J. Brown 1847); DRONE,
supra note 12, at 383.
142. DRONE, supra note 12, at 399.
143. For an early development of the idea, see Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139
(1801) (citing Sayre v. Moore [Hil. 1785] 1 East. 361). For a theoretical account of independent
creation, see DRASSINOWER, supra note 49.
144. See, e.g., Cary, 102 Eng. Rep. at 139 (citing Sayre, 1 East. 361); id. at 140 (citing
Trusler v. Murray, 1 East. 363 (Mich. 1789) (Eng.)); Matthew v. Stockdale, [1806] 33 Eng.
Rep. 103; Emerson v. Davie, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845); see also CURTIS, supra note
141, at 258-59.
145. CURTIS, supra note 141, at 258; Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 617.
MATIC AND
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Comparison of the two works is, of course, the test to which
the question should be brought. Among the proofs of piracy,
upon which the courts have been much in the habit of relying, is
the occurrence of the same inaccuracies in the two books; and
when the question is, whether the defendant, in preparing his
book, had before him and copied or imitated the book of the
plaintiff, it is manifest that this kind of evidence is the strongest
proof, short of direct evidence, of which the fact is capable.146

In comparing the two works, the inquiry came to focus on
“inaccuracies” and “common errors,” which were especially difficult
to explain away as either a coincidence or as having come from a
common source.147 Further, as the above quoted observation reveals,
the similarity was seen as allowing for an inference not just of the
result of the copying but also of the act of appropriation that produced the result at issue. Courts therefore readily recognized the
necessarily inferential nature of the comparison and its orientation
as a mechanism of circumstantial evidence. All the same, they did
not foreclose buttressing the inquiry with other forms of evidence.148
Eaton Drone, author of the most influential nineteenth-century
copyright treatise, synthesized courts’ approach succinctly:
When the defendant frankly admits the extent to which the
plaintiff ’s work has been used, and his evidence is accepted as
conclusive, the fact [of copying] will thereby be established, and
the law determined accordingly.... [When] copying is denied ...
[a] comparison of the two works will then be made with the aid
of such direct or circumstantial evidence as may be available;
and not unfrequently the question will have to be determined
solely or chiefly by the internal evidence afforded by such
comparison.149

146. CURTIS, supra note 141, at 254-55.
147. See, e.g., Longman v. Winchester, [1809] 33 Eng. Rep. 987; 16 Ves. Jun. 269 (finding
inaccuracies in a comparison of the two works to conclude that one was copied from the other);
Mawman v. Tegg, [1826] 38 Eng. Rep. 380; 2 Russ. 385 (relying on extensive similarity to
infer copying); see also CURTIS, supra note 141, at 255-56.
148. DRONE, supra note 12, at 428 (noting how courts will use such evidence “as may be
available” to them).
149. Id.
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While additional evidence could be resorted to during this inferential process, similarity remained foundational. Additionally,
when the similarity amounted to a “substantial identity” or “striking resemblance,” it generated “a presumption of unlawful copying,”
which the defendant then had the burden of overcoming.150
Over time, evidence of similarity thus came to play a pivotal role
in proving the fact of a defendant’s copying. All the same, additional
direct or circumstantial evidence could be used to supplement such
similarity. And it is in the interaction of similarity with such
additional evidence that the inverse ratio rule emerged.
A. Origins and Crystallization
The primary form of additional evidence—beyond similarity—that
courts came to consider in their inquiry into factual copying was the
question of a defendant’s access to the work. Indeed, access was a
factor that helped a court make sense of the similarity, because it
allowed for an inference that the similarity (if any) was more likely
than not the result of copying. In one early Ninth Circuit decision,
the court relied heavily on the evidence showing a defendant’s
access to the work to conclude that the similarity between the two
works could not have been merely coincidental or the product of
independent creation.151 A few years later, in Shipman v. R.K.O.
Radio Pictures, Inc., the Second Circuit converted this use of access
into a principled formulation:
[P]iracy ... include[s] both deliberate and unintentional use. As
to this latter element, access becomes important, for then
accidental similarity assumes a low degree of probability; and
this leads us to conclude that where there is access, there is a
high degree of probability that the similarity results from
copying and not from independent thought and imagination.
Indeed, it might well be said that where access is proved or
admitted, there is a presumption that the similarity is not
accidental.152

150. Id. at 400, 634; see also Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1136 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1868)
(describing the “substantial identity” test for infringement).
151. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 39 (9th Cir. 1933).
152. 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938).

336

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:299

The Shipman court then sharpened the point even further: “[I]f
there is access, the probability that the similarities are the result of
copying, intentional or unintentional, is so high that there is only
one pertinent question: are the similarities of matters which justify
the infringement claimed?”153 Applying that logic to the facts of the
case, the court used the “admission of access” to determine the
“weight to be given to similarities” between the works.154
In this formulation, access served to explain the significance of
the similarity, thereby strengthening the inference of copying that
could be drawn from it. Put another way, the Shipman court’s early
framing unequivocally identified a relationship of conditional probative value between access and similarity. Evidence of access
operated as a factual predicate for the proffered fact of similarity,
from which the circumstantial inference of copyright could be
drawn.155 Of course, such similarity was not altogether devoid of
probative significance without evidence of access; yet, proof of access significantly enhanced the probative value of such similarity.
Quite notably, in Shipman the Second Circuit had said little
about the nature of the relationship between access and similarity,
beyond noting that proof of access strengthened the inference (of
copying) that a court might reasonably draw from the similarity. A
decade after Shipman, the Supreme Court of California developed
the inferential logic one step further in a case involving common law
copyright.156 Relying on Shipman’s formulation that proof of access
along with a showing of similarity readily favored an inference of
copying, the court broke this idea down further, effectively offering
up the first statement of the inverse ratio rule: “[w]here there is
strong evidence of access, less proof of similarity may suffice.
Conversely, if the evidence of access is uncertain, strong proof of
similarity should be shown before the inference of copying may be
indulged.”157
In effect, this observation for the first time recognized the
reciprocal conditionality underlying access and similarity in their

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 221 P.2d 95 (Cal. 1950).
Id. at 98.
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probative values vis-à-vis the inference of copying.158 Very importantly, the relationship remained centered around similarity, which
was the key inference point from which copying was to be inferred.
The court reiterated this when it later observed that “[p]roof of
access, however, establishes no more than the opportunity to copy
and not actual copying.”159 Nevertheless, when presented with
strong proof of access, the court readily drew an inference of actual
copying despite there being differences between the works.160
A few years immediately prior to the California Supreme Court’s
formulation, the same idea had been integrated by the Second
Circuit into its reformulated test for copyright infringement, presumably relying on Shipman. In Arnstein v. Porter, where the court
developed a bifurcated test for infringement—separating the analysis into factual copying and improper appropriation—it offered the
following summary of the manner in which factual copying might be
established using circumstantial evidence:
[I]f there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will
suffice to prove copying. If there is evidence of access and
similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine
whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying.... If
evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so striking
as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant
independently arrived at the same result.161

The first use of the phrase “inverse ratio” occurred a few years
later in an opinion by a district court in the same jurisdiction: Morse
v. Fields.162 In the case, Judge Irving Kaufman was presented with
the argument that the plaintiff could rely on a reduced degree of
similarity between the works because it had established access by
the defendant.163 Judge Kaufman was quick to reject the argument,
noting that the plaintiff had merely relied on “circumstantial
evidence of access” rather than direct evidence of that factual

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
Golding, 221 P.2d at 99.
Id. at 100-01.
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
127 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Id.
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predicate.164 This, to him, revealed no more than a “bare opportunity
to copy,” which did not permit the stacking of inferences: that is, of
an inference of copying from an inference of access.165 The inverse
ratio rule, in his view, required direct evidence of the predicate
fact—access—if it was to supplement the probative value of the
proffered fact, that is, similarity.166 Moving to the scrutiny of similarity, the court then undertook an elaborate analysis of the
evidence to conclude that the similarities were the result of the
parties’ “use of a common source” rather than actual copying.167
Morse is a particularly noteworthy decision for a few reasons.
First, it highlights the core idea of conditional probative value
underlying the inverse ratio rule.168 Insofar as the predicate fact is
itself based on circumstantial evidence (that is, an inference) and
not direct evidence, its ability to compensate for the lower probative
value of the predicate fact remains dubious. Judge Kaufman’s astute recognition of this distinction carefully melded evidence law
principles with the logic of copyright.169 Second, the opinion showcases how the rule is a two-edged sword, rather than a mere shortcut for plaintiffs, as some have claimed.170 The plaintiff ’s simplistic
invocation of the rule moved the judge to scrutinize the probative
value of the predicate fact—that is, access—which proved detrimental to the plaintiff ’s own case.171 Instead of finding the evidence of
access to be strong (and therefore permitting a lesser degree of
similarity), the court’s engagement with the probative value of that
evidence led it to find the evidence to instead be weak, and a
fortiorari, require a greater degree of similarity, which was absent.
And finally, Morse reveals how the rule is to operate in the context
of a full factual record, where the court is presented with competing
testimony and evidentiary inferences and must collate them
together in examining the ultimate legal conclusion, that is, factual
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 68.
168. See id. at 66-67.
169. See id.
170. As we shall see, this issue emerged in Skidmore most directly, where the Ninth Circuit
characterized the rule as the “inverse burden rule” and criticized it for making proof of
copying easy for certain categories of works. See infra Part III.C.
171. Morse, 127 F. Supp. at 69.

2022]

PROVING COPYING

339

copying. Most modern discussion of the rule has focused on its
working at the appellate level, by which time the factual record is
complete and reviewed secondhand and with deference to the factfinder.
B. Early Confusion: The Myth of “Rejection”
Following the Second Circuit’s adoption of a new test for copyright
infringement in Arnstein and its incorporation of the inverse ratio
rule into that test, courts soon came to apply the basic idea underlying the rule with few problems. The Arnstein decision had proven to
be fairly controversial, with a prominent member of the panel—
Judge Charles Clark—writing a strongly worded dissent in the case,
criticizing the basic framework.172 Nevertheless, in the immediate
aftermath of Arnstein, even Judge Clark found the logic of conditional probative value underlying the inverse ratio rule to be altogether unproblematic, in one case observing plainly that “[w]here
access is proved ... likenesses between the copyrighted work and the
putative piracy may give rise to an inference of plagiarism.”173
Given this observation, it is somewhat ironic that it was none
other than Judge Clark who would sow the seeds of confusion
around the inverse ratio rule a decade later. In Arc Music Corp. v.
Lee, the plaintiff brought an action asserting infringement of its
song by the defendant’s similar song.174 The lower court had found
for the defendant on the basis that the allegedly plagiarized song
was independently created.175 The principal ground of the plaintiff’s
appeal was that the lower court had failed to apply the inverse ratio
rule or instruct the jury to that effect.176 In affirming the lower
court’s decision, Judge Clark had the following to say about the
inverse ratio rule:
In the federal law of copyright we find no such principle.... We
fear that counsel with that semantic proclivity natural to our
profession have allowed themselves to be seduced by a
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
Ricker v. Gen. Elec. Co., 162 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1947).
296 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 186.
Id.
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superficially attractive apophthegm which upon examination
confuses more than it clarifies. The logical outcome of the
claimed principle is obviously that proof of actual access will
render a showing of similarities entirely unnecessary. Plaintiff
naturally does not go so far; but in an endeavor to supply some
limitation, it comes up with a requested charge conflicting and
confusing on its face.177

In this observation, Judge Clark appeared to cast doubt on the
logic of the rule—as being confusing—and by suggesting that it
would appear to treat proof of access as evidence of copying. Yet
even the majority in Arnstein conceded that “if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove
copying.”178 Indeed, Judge Clark himself applied this idea in a
subsequent case.179 Thus, even while suggesting that the rule could
suggest this outcome, he rather quickly walked it back by acknowledging that the plaintiff was not suggesting this absurd position.180
He then followed it up with an unequivocal endorsement of the basic
logic underlying the rule:
Of course access shown either directly or indirectly is an element of plaintiff ’s case. And it is not an unnatural step in
inference of fact for ease of access to suggest a deduction of
copying when similarity is found. But access will not supply its
lack, and an undue stress upon that one feature can only confuse
and even conceal this basic requirement.181

Ease of access could, therefore, legitimately result in an inference
of copying, in the presence of similarity. Conversely, difficulty (or
lack) of access necessitated a stronger inference from similarity for
it to amount to evidence of copying.182
The irony in Judge Clark’s identification of “confusi[on]” underlying the inverse ratio rule is that it was his own opinion in Arc Music
that served to confuse the working and applicability of the rule into
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 187.
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
Ricker, 162 F.2d at 142.
Arc Music, 296 F.2d at 187 (“Plaintiff naturally does not go so far.”).
Id. at 187-88.
See id.
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the future.183 The opinion’s supposed “logical outcome” of the rule
used to illustrate its flawed nature was an entirely hypothetical
construct, which had been eliminated since the very origins of the
rule, a reality that Judge Clark himself acknowledged.184 Nevertheless, the opinion’s acerbic invective directed at the rule (“superficially attractive apophthegm”)185 has generated the superficial and
overly simplistic idea that Arc Music “rejected” the inverse ratio
rule.186 Multiple reasons reveal this to be mistaken.
First, as was just noted, Judge Clark himself acknowledged the
logic inherent in allowing proof of access to aid in the inference of
copying when offered in support of similarity.187 Indeed, he treated
this interaction as a “[n]atural” inference.188 Second, in the immediate aftermath of the decision in Arc Music, not a single lower court
decision citing to it read it as rejecting the inverse ratio rule. To the
contrary, they read it as allowing proof of access to buttress the inference that may be drawn from similarity,189 as merely precluding
the use of “access alone” to infer copying,190 or (somewhat strangely)
as rejecting the merger of factual copying and improper appropriation.191 Third, as we shall see, later opinions in the same jurisdiction
(the Second Circuit) invoked and applied the inverse ratio rule
without any doubt or confusion as to its continuing validity.192 This
183. Id. at 187.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc);
Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2012); 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§ 9:91 (2022).
187. See Arc Music, 296 F.2d at 187-88.
188. See id.
189. Prestige Floral, Societe Anonyme v. Cal. Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287, 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Herwitz v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 210 F. Supp. 231, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
190. Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see Arrow Novelty Co. v.
ENCO Nat’l Corp., 393 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
191. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238, 240 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
192. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Recs., 351 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Glover v.
Austin, 289 F. App’x 430, 432 (2d Cir. 2008); Gal v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Krisko v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 288, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); New
Old Music Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Price v. Fox Ent.
Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Glover v. Austin, 447 F. Supp. 2d 357,
361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Nicholls v. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); O’Keefe v. Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 500, 515
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. Valuewalk, LLC, 345 F. Supp. 3d 482, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); Dominic v. Delaloye, No. 12-CV-1551, 2012 WL 1339604, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
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extends not just to appellate court opinions but even to district
court opinions that would otherwise be bound by the supposed Arc
Music “rejection.”193
All the same, the myth of Arc Music’s “rejection” of the rule soon
took on a life of its own, especially among commentators. The
leading treatises of the time mistakenly read the opinion as having
abrogated the rule, focusing exclusively on Judge Clark’s rhetoric
and altogether ignoring his later observation about the natural
inference that could be drawn when access and similarity could be
shown.194 In due course, as we shall see, such commentary became
a self-fulfilling prophecy—insofar as later courts relied on them for
their interpretation of Arc Music—to conclude that the opinion had
rejected the rule, when it simply did not.195 And more importantly,
later judicial decisions within the Second Circuit (and by the Second
Circuit itself) continued to apply the inverse ratio rule!196
In summary, although Arc Music did not reject the inverse ratio
rule, it nevertheless successfully injected a degree of confusion and
doubt about the rule and its scope. This, in turn, produced a marked
reluctance among courts within the Second Circuit to refer to the
rule by name, even when substantively willing to deploy its
inferential logic.197 Yet, as we shall see, this had little effect on the
diffusion of the rule to other circuits, most prominently the Ninth
Circuit.

17, 2012).
193. See, e.g., Jorgensen, 351 F.3d at 56; Glover, 289 F. App’x at 432; Gal, 518 F. Supp. 2d
at 537; Krisko, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 302; New Old Music Grp., 122 F. Supp. 3d at 85; Price, 499
F. Supp. 2d at 386; Glover, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 361; Nicholls, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 522; O’Keefe,
590 F. Supp. 2d at 515; Michael Grecco Prods., 345 F. Supp. 3d at 500; Dominic, No. 12-CV1551, at *5. Also noteworthy here is that Professor Paul Goldstein has also taken the position
that Arc Music has been consistently misread and was based on a confused understanding of
the rule. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 9.2.1 (3d ed. 2021).
194. See ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL’S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE
1976 ACT 161 (5th ed. 1979); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 13.03[D][B][4], at 13D-77
n.39 (containing the discussion of the inverse ratio rule from the treatise’s 1963 edition).
195. See infra Part II.C.
196. See, e.g., Jorgensen, 351 F.3d at 56; Glover, 289 F. App’x at 432.
197. Courts identify an “inverse relationship” between access and probative similarity but
do not denominate their rule the “inverse ratio rule.” See, e.g., Jorgensen, 351 F.3d at 56;
Glover, 289 F. App’x at 432.
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C. Inter-Circuit Diffusion: The Ninth Circuit and Beyond
Despite having crystallized as a “rule” in the Second Circuit—
albeit with a detour to the California Supreme Court—the inverse
ratio rule would see its most significant impact (and eventual
demise) outside of the Second Circuit.198 While it came to be
absorbed in a somewhat convoluted manner by the Ninth Circuit,
other circuits also embraced the doctrine and its variations in
differing degrees.199 The reception of the rule by other circuits is,
therefore, best analyzed by separating out the Ninth Circuit’s
reformulation from its treatment in other circuits.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Error
Scholars have long noted the outsized influence that copyright
treatises have had on courts’ understanding and development of
copyright doctrine.200 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
story of the inverse ratio rule and the manner in which it came to
be transmitted to the Ninth Circuit, following the confusion that
Judge Clark had sown in Arc Music. Barely two years after that
decision, the country’s leading copyright treatise—Nimmer on Copyright—attempted to summarize the prevailing state of the rule.201 In
a paragraph that would come to be quoted by innumerable courts,
Mel Nimmer observed:
[E]vidence of striking similarity will permit a finding of copying
without proof of access. It is obvious that the converse proposition is not equally valid. That is, clear and convincing evidence
of access will not avoid the necessity of also proving substantial
similarity since access without similarity cannot create an
inference of copying. However, this so-called “Inverse Ratio
Rule” although completely rejected by one court, would seem to
have some limited validity. That is, since a very high degree of
198. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977); Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018).
199. See Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir. 2004).
200. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581,
591 (2004).
201. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 13D.08[B][4], at 13D-77 n.39 (containing
the discussion of the inverse ratio rule from the treatise’s 1963 edition).
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similarity is required in order to dispense with proof of access,
it must logically follow that where proof of access is offered, the
required degree of similarity may be somewhat less than would
be necessary in the absence of such proof. That is not to say that
a showing of substantial similarity may ever be avoided. But the
striking similarity (e.g. word for word) which goes beyond mere
substantial similarity, required without proof of access, becomes
unnecessary where access is shown.202

Given the attention that this paragraph has received, it is worth
unpacking its key points without the judicial gloss that it came to
be embellished with. Most obviously, Mel Nimmer made the mistake of reading Arc Music as “reject[ing]” the rule;203 however, a
closer reading would have revealed this to not be the case. All the
same, he saw the rule to have “validity.”204 That validity was
“limited” only in the sense that the conditional relationship between
access and similarity was not reciprocal, but rather unidirectional,
as noted previously.205 That is, extensive (“striking”) similarity could
dispense with the need to show access, whereas the converse (strong
proof of access) would never eliminate the need to show some similarity for the case to move forward.206 Indeed, Judge Clark recognized this to be true, as did Arnstein.207 The “limited validity” was
therefore in some sense a misnomer because the inverse ratio rule
had always embodied this limitation; whereas Nimmer made it
sound as though Arc Music had introduced the limit.208
All else aside though, Nimmer made one seemingly unintentional—yet, very consequential—choice in language that would steer
courts offtrack for several decades. Despite recognizing that the
inverse ratio rule was directed at proof of “copying,” in the later part
of the paragraph he referenced the degree of similarity as lying
along a continuum between “substantial” and “striking,” juxtaposing

202. Id. (footnote omitted).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961); Arnstein v. Porter, 154
F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
208. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 13D.08[B][4], at 13D-77 n.39.
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striking similarity against “mere substantial similarity.”209 While
Nimmer may have intended the term “mere substantial similarity”
to connote nothing more than a lesser degree of similarity between
the works for an inference of copying, the term “substantial similarity” had by then come to be recognized as the term of choice for the
second stage of the infringement inquiry: that is, improper appropriation.210 At this stage of the inquiry, a court was to do more than
just assess whether there was copying, but rather judge the legality
of such copying as a subjective matter.211 Despite only ever using the
term “substantial similarity” to mean a degree of similarity less
than striking but nonetheless sufficient to infer copying, to the lessnuanced reader Nimmer was implying a relationship between proof
of access and improper appropriation.212 In other words, his language was capable of being read as suggesting an inverse relationship between the degree of proof on access and the amount of
similarity needed to assess the legality of the copying. This was well
outside the scope of the inverse ratio rule, which had been developed
entirely as a rule of evidence and thus limited to the first stage of
the inquiry: actual copying.213
More than a decade later, the Ninth Circuit developed its own test
for copyright infringement in the well-known case of Sid & Marty
Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp.214 Relying on the idea of a
bifurcated test seen in the Second Circuit’s Arnstein decision, the
Ninth Circuit in Krofft chose to develop its own two-pronged approach to copyright infringement.215 Yet, unlike the Arnstein test,
both prongs of the Krofft formulation focused on improper appropriation or “substantial similarity.”216 The first merely deployed objective criteria and was styled the “extrinsic” prong, while the second
examined the legality of the similarity from the perspective of a lay
observer and was titled the “intrinsic” prong.217 Altogether missing
from the Krofft formulation was the all-important preliminary step
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See supra Part I.
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
See id. at 1164.
Id.
Id.
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of actual copying!218 In its place, the Ninth Circuit posited that proof
of access would suffice, understood as “an opportunity to view or to
copy” the work.219
It is important to appreciate the significance of this omission, for
it was no mere formality. By eliminating the need for a court to
make an inference of actual copying from the evidence of access and
similarity, a plaintiff—under the Ninth Circuit’s Krofft formulation—could obtain a finding of copyright infringement by showing
that the defendant had access to the work and that the similarity
between the works was improper (objectively and subjectively).220
Independent creation, the critical flip side of the actual copying
inquiry, found no mention in the court’s lengthy opinion. Thus, if a
defendant were found to have some reasonable opportunity to possibly view the protected work, even if based on circumstantial
evidence alone, a court’s assessment of similarity was all that was
needed to produce a finding of infringement.221 A defendant’s argument as to independent creation was irrelevant, unless it could
rebut either access or improper appropriation.222
Making matters significantly worse, the Ninth Circuit in Krofft
decided to apply the logic of the inverse ratio rule to its newly
created test.223 And rather unfortunately here, it chose to quote and
rely on the Nimmer treatise.224 Whereas the treatise’s use of “substantial similarity” fully retained a separate “copying” in fact step,
the Krofft court deployed that term—and the treatise’s use of the
phrase—to altogether eliminate any inquiry into copying, and
instead recognize an inverse relationship between proof of access
and the legality of the similarity.225 As it observed, “where clear and
convincing evidence of access is presented, the quantum of proof
required to show substantial similarity may ... be lower.”226 It is
difficult to see what the court had in mind because substantial similarity (that is, improper appropriation) is not a question of proof,
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id.
Id. at 1172.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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but rather one of judgment—objective and subjective.227 In other
words, it is hardly a question of fact, and thus the reference to
“quantum of proof” is perplexing and mistaken.228 Perhaps the court
had in mind little more than a lowering of the standard for judgment (analogous to the difference in degree between “strict scrutiny”
and “rational basis” scrutiny in constitutional law), but if that was
indeed the court’s design, it had no connection whatsoever to the
evidentiary logic of the inverse ratio rule.229 As the final bit of icing
to its layered cake of accumulated errors, the Krofft court recognized
that it was disagreeing with Arc Music, thus reinforcing the faulty
reading of Judge Clark’s opinion.230
The Krofft formulation continues to dominate the Ninth Circuit’s
copyright infringement jurisprudence, although courts have modified some minor aspects of its framework.231 Until very recently, its
complete elimination of the actual copying requirement and misapplication of the inverse ratio rule produced absurd results in
innumerable cases. Exemplary of such absurdity is the court’s decision in Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, wherein the pop-musician
Michael Bolton was found to have infringed an R&B song of the
same name by the Isley Brothers that was released decades
before.232 To arrive at its conclusion, the court first found there was
access, on the premise that the Isley Brothers’ song had been played
multiple times on radio stations within the geographic region where
the defendant had grown up, and that the defendant was a “huge
fan” of the Isley Brothers’ music.233 The court then moved to the
question of substantial similarity and found that there was some
minimal similarity between the works, even if only as a “circumstantial case,” and concluded that infringement had been established.234
227. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63-65 (2d Cir.
2010).
228. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172.
229. For a general overview of the tiers of scrutiny in constitutional law analysis, see
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397 (1998).
230. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172; supra Part II.B.
231. See, e.g., Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987); Aliotti v. R. Dakin &
Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir.
1990).
232. 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000).
233. Id. at 483-85.
234. Id. at 486.
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At no point was the defendant able to present a separate argument for independent creation, except to rebut the plaintiff ’s access
and/or substantial similarity.235 Thus, Three Boys Music showcases
the absurdity of eliminating an inquiry into actual copying. The
case shows that after Krofft, a defendant’s independent creation was
altogether meaningless because access and substantial similarity
could determine the case on their own, even when such independent
creation was present. While the original inverse ratio rule was directed at displacing the possibility of independent creation (through
proof of copying),236 Krofft’s erroneous version allowed for the
distinct possibility of independent creation, despite a finding of
copyright infringement—an illogical absurdity, to say the least.
In addition to its substantive problem, the Krofft formulation also
introduced an additional problem into the infringement inquiry
when it abandoned the intermediate step of considering factual
copying altogether. As noted above, Krofft (and its progeny in the
Ninth Circuit) replaced the requirement of factual copying with that
of “access.” On its face, this change merely adopted one (of the two)
inference points commonly used as circumstantial proof of copying.
Yet, it did much more. In converting access into an element of the
infringement test and thus requiring a plaintiff to establish it each
time for the case to move forward, the Krofft test effectively imbued
access with its own standard of proof. Being an element—rather
than an inference point—now meant that the plaintiff had to show
access by a preponderance of evidence, that is, that its existence was
more likely than not.237 This marked a major shift from the role that
access had played in the original inverse ratio rule, where it never
had its own standard of proof and operated instead as a component
(inference point) of the factual copying element.238 As this Article
illustrates, this elevation of access would prove disastrous in the
Ninth Circuit because it implicitly confounded how best to reconcile
the seemingly divergent evidentiary burdens. If treated as an
independent element—and imbued with the preponderance
235. See id.
236. See supra Part II.A.
237. See, e.g., Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1123 n.11 (9th Cir. 2018) (using a jury
instruction that noted the plaintiff ’s burden of “showing by a preponderance of the evidence”
that the defendants “had access to the ... copyrighted work”).
238. See supra Part II.A.
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standard—the sliding scale underlying the inverse ratio would now
embody an additional threshold for it to operate. Yet, to deny it an
independent standard would be at odds with its status as an element. Surprisingly, not one court or commentator recognized this
contradiction.
Krofft’s erroneous formulation of the inverse ratio rule continued
to be applied within the Ninth Circuit for decades. Despite strong
criticism in the commentary, and from occasional panels, courts
continued to deploy it to lower their standard of scrutiny on substantial similarity upon a showing of access.239 The absence of a
distinct actual copying prong rendered this framing somewhat inevitable because among other things, it also allowed a court to mask
its judgment on substantial similarity as a question of proof that
was dependent on the evidence seen in the factual record.240 The
Ninth Circuit’s formulation thus thrived for over four decades with
little, if any, modification.
2. Reception and Validation in Other Circuits
Not all circuits readily absorbed the inverse ratio rule in equal
measure. Instead, they did so in varying degrees. This somewhat
muted and disjointed reception can be accounted for by the confusion surrounding the rule, first sown by Arc Music and later entrenched by the Ninth Circuit in Krofft.241 All the same, very few
circuits to have considered the rule have rejected it and numerous
courts apply it in conformity with the evidentiary principles on
which it was based.
The Seventh Circuit follows the two-step bifurcation between
actual copying and improper appropriation developed in Arnstein.
In its often-cited decision in Selle v. Gibb, the court dealt with the
doctrine of “striking similarity” and, as part of that discussion,
examined the relationship between proof of access and the degree of

239. See, e.g., Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th
Cir. 2006); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000); Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990).
240. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
241. See supra Part II.C.1.
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similarity, the combination of which would allow for an inference of
actual copying.242 Thereafter, it endorsed the inverse ratio rule:
At oral argument, plaintiff ’s attorney analyzed the degree of
similarity required to establish an inference of access as being
in an inverse ratio to the quantum of direct evidence adduced to
establish access. While we have found no authoritative support
for this analysis, it seems appropriate. In this case, it would
therefore appear that, because the plaintiff has introduced
virtually no direct evidence of access, the degree of similarity
required to establish copying in this case is considerable.243

A few years later, Chief Judge Posner endorsed the rule in another opinion, and went to some length to explain its logic, recognizing
the inferential nature of circumstantial proof.244 More recently, in
Peters v. West, the Seventh Circuit noted that while the Ninth
Circuit followed the rule, the Second Circuit had “rejected” it, citing
to Arc Music.245 Nevertheless, the court decided to adopt its own
independent position on the rule, noting that it “ha[d] occasionally
endorsed something that comes close to this inverse approach” even
if its “rule ha[d] not been so explicit” as the Ninth Circuit’s.246 In so
doing, the court in Peters nevertheless expressed reservation about
allowing an inference of copying when proof of access was strong but
the similarity very weak, preferring instead to allow for varying
levels of proof of access based on the extent of the similarity.247 The
Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to embrace the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence is indeed understandable and wise, as reflected in the
Ninth Circuit’s inchoate appreciation of the factual copying requirement and its application of the inverse ratio rule to the
improper appropriation prong of the infringement analysis.248
The Sixth Circuit recognized the inverse ratio rule in its 1999
decision in Ellis v. Diffie, observing that the “stronger the similarity
242. 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984).
243. Id. at 903 n.4.
244. Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997).
245. 692 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2012).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 635 (“Notably, however, we have never endorsed the other side of the inverse
relation.”).
248. See supra Part II.C.1.
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between the two works in question, the less compelling the proof of
access needs to be.”249 Later decisions of the court reiterated their
support for the rule.250 More recently, however, following the Ninth
Circuit’s mistaken abrogation of the rule in Skidmore, a panel of
the Sixth Circuit expressed doubts about the continuing utility of
the rule, noting that it “appear[ed] to be on its last legs.”251 Nevertheless, the court chose not to address the question, leaving it for
another day when it had occasion to consider the issue more fully.252
Even though it does not reject the inverse ratio rule, the Eleventh
Circuit has declined to require it. On two separate occasions, the
Eleventh Circuit reiterated that the rule had “never” been applied
in its circuit when raised as a ground on which to challenge a district court’s opinion.253 On neither occasion did it offer a reason for
not applying it, indicating that the circuit’s position is not a considered choice.254
In a similar vein, the Fifth Circuit has refused to make it a mandatory rule. In Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, the
court considered the rule at length, even quoting extensively from
out-of-circuit cases that had adopted it to suggest that the rule had
significant merit.255 Nevertheless, it ultimately chose not to apply
the rule to the case at hand because such application could not form
a valid basis for reversing the jury given that the rule had not been
“explicitly adopted” by a prior decision.256 A later district court
opinion in the circuit seems to have read Positive Black Talk as endorsing the rule, by referencing the rule and opinion without additional discussion, thereby suggesting that the rule informed its
analysis of the similarity.257

249. 177 F.3d 503, 507 (6th Cir. 1999).
250. See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312,
317 (6th Cir. 2004); Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir. 2004).
251. Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 536-37 n.1
(6th Cir. 2020).
252. Id. (“But we do not answer them today.”).
253. Dream Custom Homes, Inc. v. Mod. Day Const., Inc., 476 F. App’x 190, 192 (11th Cir.
2012); Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 460 (11th Cir. 1994).
254. See Dream Custom Homes, 476 F. App’x at 192; Beal, 20 F.3d at 460.
255. 394 F.3d 357, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2004).
256. Id. at 372.
257. Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 600 n.4 (E.D. La. 2014).
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D. The Ninth Circuit Correction and Repudiation
Despite the diffusion of the inverse rule to other circuits around
the country, it was in the Ninth Circuit that the rule saw its most
extensive usage and reliance.258 And unfortunately, such reliance
was of the erroneous version, which conflated the improper appropriation and actual copying components of the inquiry and posited
an inverse relationship between access and “substantial similarity”
following from the court’s formulation in Krofft.259
After struggling with Krofft’s erroneous formulation for four
decades, the Ninth Circuit corrected itself in 2018, aligning itself
with the Second Circuit’s correct version of the inverse ratio rule:
one that was premised on the core principles of circumstantial evidence described earlier.260 All the same, this course correction was
short-lived. The court failed to remain consistent in its own application of the rule even after that correction. Barely two years later,
an en banc opinion of the court in Skidmore fully abrogated the
doctrine—and its variations, both erroneous and correct.261 Misled
by observations about the logic motivating the rule and the rule’s
status as the doctrine in other circuits, the Skidmore court revoked
the doctrine altogether, purporting to align copyright jurisprudence
with evidence law and the laws of its “sister circuits.”262 As we shall
see below, this excision lacked an analytical basis and was altogether unwarranted.
1. The Correction
The Ninth Circuit rectified its application of the inverse ratio rule
in a 2018 decision. In Rentmeester v. Nike, Jacob Rentmeester
sought to invoke the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous version of the inverse
ratio rule to support his tenuous assertion that Nike improperly
appropriated his photograph of a young Michael Jordan for its advertisements and “Jumpman” logo featured on Nike shoes, clothing,

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.1.
Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
See 952 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
See id.
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posters, and other merchandise.263 Before Michael Jordan emerged
as the greatest basketball player in history, Rentmeester captured
the college star flying through the air toward a basketball hoop in
a staged pose reminiscent of grand jeté, a dramatic ballet movement.264 Life Magazine included the photo as part of a feature in
1984.265 That image was later used by Nike to stage a photograph of
Michael Jordan against the Chicago skyline and to develop the
iconic Jumpman logo for Nike’s highly successful Air Jordan product
line.266
Nike conceded factual copying but nonetheless filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that Nike’s works were not substantially
similar to protected expression as a matter of law.267 Nike asserted,
in essence, that Rentmeester’s claim boiled down to an unoriginal
pose, which is an unprotectable idea.268 And in any event, Rentmeester’s copyright garnered only thin protection, which Ninth
Circuit law protects only against virtual identity.269 Nike highlighted the many unprotectable elements of Rentmeester’s photograph and numerous differences (mood, lighting setting, clothing,
scale, stance, color, lighting, and props) between the plaintiff ’s and
defendant’s works.270
In resolving Nike’s motion to dismiss, the district court looked to
the Ninth Circuit decision in Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment,
Inc., relating to the standard for improper appropriation, where the
court explained:
If there’s a wide range of expression (for example, there are gazillions of ways to make an aliens-attack movie), then copyright
263. No. 15-cv-00113, 2015 WL 3766546, at *1-2 (D. Or. June 19, 2015), aff ’d, 883 F.3d
1111 (9th Cir. 2018).
264. Id. at *1.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Nike’s Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Memorandum, Rentmeester, 2015 WL
3766546 (No. 15-cv-00113).
268. Id.
269. See Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206 n.14 (D.
Haw. 2006) (“[I]n cases involving photographs, a ‘[p]laintiff ’s copyrights cannot monopolize
the various poses used,’ and ‘can protect only [p]laintiff s particular photographic expression
of these poses and not the underlying ideas therefor.’” (quoting Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris,
Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1987))).
270. Nike’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 267, at 23-29.
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protection is “broad” and a work will infringe if it’s “substantially similar” to the copyrighted work. If there’s only a narrow
range of expression (for example, there are only so many ways
to paint a red bouncy ball on blank canvas), then copyright
protection is “thin” and a work must be “virtually” identical to
infringe.271

Applying this framework as well as general principles of filtering
out unprotectable elements of the plaintiff ’s work, the district court
concluded that very little of the selection and arrangement of elements in Rentmeester’s photograph were original and that Nike’s
photograph and logo were not substantially similar to the plaintiff’s
work.272 On appeal, Rentmeester contended that the district court
applied too high a standard by failing to employ the inverse ratio
rule.273 In particular, he asserted that Nike’s concession of access
entitled him to a lower similarity threshold on the question of improper appropriation.274 During oral argument, Judge Berzon
pressed Rentmeester’s counsel to explain the rationale behind the
rule:
Judge Berzon: ... [M]y understanding is that substantial
similarity can come in at the stage of whether there was in fact
copying and it’s a different substantial similarity essentially
and I am not at all sure that the cases that talk about the inverse ratio aren’t talking about that stage because there’s
nothing logical at all about the notion that the degree of access,
it seems to me that the question of whether there has been a
copyright violation ought to deal simply with the actual artworks and I don’t understand why there is a different similarity
level depending on how sure you are that it was copied. I mean,
even if the cases also say that even if we know that it was copied
that they started out with the other picture and then they varied
it in various ways, the question is should they vary it enough
that they weren’t infringing the copyright. Now, I don’t know
what difference it makes what the level of access was. Is there
any case that explains that?

271.
272.
273.
274.

616 F.3d 904, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Rentmeester, 2015 WL 3766546, at *4-7.
Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
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Rentmeester Counsel: Yes, there are many. There is a Ninth
Circuit Model Jury Instruction.
Judge Berzon: I know. I want to know what explains the logic of
it. What’s the logic of it?
Rentmeester Counsel: What you are trying to do with the substantial similarity test is that you don’t have direct evidence of
copying, so you are trying to assess circumstantial evidence.
Judge Berzon: My understanding is that that is a different point.
Because substantial similarity when you are using it that way
is a way of trying to figure out whether the copying prong was
met. But that’s not where we are as I understand it. What we
are trying to figure out is as I understand it, even assuming that
[Nike’s artist] said “Gee, I really like that [Rentmeester’s]
picture, I would like to have something like it but different in
various ways; I like the idea behind this but we’re going to do it
differently.”... [T]hat’s enough evidence of the copying prong as
I understand it, but it doesn’t tell you anything about whether
there was a copyright violation. Am I right? Do I have my concepts right?
Rentmeester Counsel: I believe that you are wrong your
honor....275

The panel was not persuaded.276 The court’s opinion affirming
dismissal, authored by Judge Watford and joined by Judge Berzon,
clarified that the inverse ratio rule focuses solely on assessing factual copying and does not affect the standard applied in assessing
improper appropriation.277
Rentmeester thus rectified the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of
the inverse ratio rule. Indeed, it represents one of the clearest formulations of the rule offered by a court to date. The Ninth Circuit
declined to grant en banc review and, perhaps recognizing the Ninth
Circuit’s conflation of standards for factual copying and improper
275. Oral Argument at 6:44-8:54, Rentmeester, 883 F.3d 1111 (No. 15-835509), https://www.
ca9.uscourts.gov/media/video/?20170711/15-35509/ [https://perma.cc/M4L8-9JDS].
276. See Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1125.
277. Id. at 1124-25. Judge Owens concurred in these aspects of the opinion. See id. at 112728 (Owens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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appropriation, Rentmeester did not raise this issue in his petition
for a writ of certiorari.278 He apparently did not see the panel opinion creating a circuit split.279 Rentmeester instead focused exclusively on the scope of protection for photography.280
Perhaps out of concern for the rule that only the en banc court can
overrule prior panel decisions, Rentmeester unwittingly contributed
to the eventual demise of the inverse ratio rule entirely. Instead of
explicitly clarifying the rule and admitting that prior opinions—
beginning with Krofft—had made an error in their understanding
and application of the rule, the court in Rentmeester did no more
than just apply its correct formulation of the rule to the dispute at
hand.281 In other words, in overt and direct terms, the court did little
to correct the mistakes of its predecessors or indeed to overrule prior
precedent to the contrary. As such then, its intervention portrayed
the rule as having been inconsistently—rather than erroneously—
applied in the Ninth Circuit. In turn, this seemed to lend credence
to the myth that the rule as a whole was confusing and devoid of
sound reason—a myth that would influence the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc for a few years. As we will see below, the en banc court
in Skidmore interpreted the law of sister circuits to be at odds with
the Rentmeester panel decision, but in a surprising direction.
2. Public Disagreement
Less than a month after Rentmeester, a different panel of the
Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in Williams v. Gaye, a case
involving the alleged copying by musicians Robin Thicke and
Pharrell Williams in their composition “Blurred Lines” of legendary
songwriter and recording artist Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It
Up.”282 Following an infringement verdict and large damages recovery,283 the defendant appealed.284 Despite Rentmeester having
278. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1375
(2018) (No. 18-728).
279. See id.
280. Id. at 5.
281. See Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.
282. See generally Special Verdict, Williams v. Gaye, 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10,
2015) (No. 13-06004), ECF No. 320.
283. See id. at *147-49.
284. See generally Notice of Cross-Appeal, Williams, 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14,
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clarified the application of the inverse ratio rule a few weeks earlier,
a majority of the panel invoked the erroneous version of the rule
that Krofft had propagated in affirming the lower court’s decision:
“[o]ur inverse ratio rule provides that the stronger the showing of
access, the lesser the showing of substantial similarity is required.”285 The panel went on to characterize the inverse ratio rule
as “binding precedent” under circuit law, which it was “bound to
apply.”286
In dissent, Judge Nguyen was quick to point out the error in the
majority’s conflation of actual copying and improper appropriation.287 Citing to treatise writers who had been critical of the rule,
she noted:
Worse still, the majority invokes the oft-criticized “inverse ratio”
rule to suggest that the Gayes faced a fairly low bar in showing
substantial similarity just because Williams and Thicke conceded access .... The issue, however, isn’t whether Williams and
Thicke copied .... [r]ather, the issue is whether they took too
much.288

On its own, this criticism might have been of little moment given
how long the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous formulation had stood. Yet,
a few months after issuing the original opinion in the case, the
members of the panel appear to have been made aware of the
Rentmeester course correction, eliminating the applicability of the
inverse ratio rule as part of the improper appropriation inquiry.289
In a surprising move, the Gaye panelists—both majority and dissent—withdrew their original opinions and issued amended ones,
this time eliminating all reference to the inverse ratio rule!290
Rather than amend the opinion to apply the rule correctly and
clarify the state of Ninth Circuit law, the majority chose to excise all
mention of the rule.
2016) (No. 13-06004), ECF No. 508.
285. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1163 (9th Cir. 2018), amended and superceded 895
F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
286. Id. at 1163 n.6.
287. See id. at 1186 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (citation omitted).
289. See Williams, 895 F.3d at 1107, 1119-20.
290. Id. at 1107, 1115.
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This rather public, although muted, disagreement over the rule
in the circuit and the panel’s seeming acknowledgment of the lack
of clarity over the rule, its status within the circuit, and its continuing vitality sowed additional doubt over its basis. It was therefore
not surprising that when the next opportunity arose, the Ninth
Circuit would seek to revisit the rule in an en banc setting. What
was surprising was how they did so.
3. The Repudiation/Overcorrection
The course correction effected by Rentmeester did not go unnoticed. Soon after the decision, courts within the Ninth Circuit began
to incorporate a reformulated inverse ratio rule, which effectively
introduced an independent element (of actual copying) into the
flawed Krofft test. And on this element, they now allowed a plaintiff
to rely on weaker proof of similarity when greater access was proven, and vice versa. All the same, not one opinion acknowledged the
change that Rentmeester had effected, or indeed the error embodied
in the original Krofft formulation that Rentmeester had corrected.
The correction was, however, to be short-lived. Less than two years
later, the Ninth Circuit overcorrected.291
a. The Skidmore Trial Decision
Around the time that the Rentmeester case was making its way
through the district court, a trustee (Michael Skidmore) acting for
a trust in the name of Randy Wolfe, a member of the band Spirit,
brought an action for copyright infringement against the legendary
rock band Led Zeppelin, alleging that the acoustic introductory
section of “Stairway to Heaven” infringed Wolfe’s composition
“Taurus.”292 Jimmy Page and Robert Plant, the credited composers
of “Stairway to Heaven,” denied ever hearing, no less copying,
“Taurus.”293
291. See generally Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
292. Id.
293. See Declaration of James Patrick Page in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:15-cv03462-RGK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016), ECF No. 97-2 (“Prior to hearing a recording of
Taurus in 2014 in connection with this matter, I had never heard Taurus or even heard of
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One of the key pretrial issues in the case centered on whether the
jury would be permitted to hear the original “Taurus” sound recording.294 The defendants contended that the copyright in the
“Taurus” musical composition was limited to the lead sheet deposited with the Copyright Office at the time that the work was
registered.295 Even though the sound recording reflected the most
complete evidence of what Wolfe composed, and the Ninth Circuit
had allowed a pre-1972 sound recording to be played at trial in the
Bolton case,296 Judge Klausner barred use of the “Taurus” sound
recording at trial.297 As a result, Skidmore’s counsel could not play
the “Taurus” sound recording at trial as part of its effort to prove
factual copying or improper appropriation, and the parties’ musical
experts were limited to the lead sheet in demonstrating Wolfe’s
musical composition and offering their views about the similarity
between “Taurus” and “Stairway to Heaven.”298
At trial, Skidmore introduced both direct and circumstantial
evidence of the defendant’s access to “Taurus,” including documentary and testimonial evidence that the bands performed in succession on a few occasions and that Jimmy Page owned the Spirit
album containing “Taurus.”299 Page and Plant asserted that they
independently created “Stairway to Heaven” and that any similarity
to “Taurus” was attributable to the use of a descending chromatic
line chord progression and arpeggios, common musical elements
found in numerous popular songs that predated “Taurus.”300

it.”); Declaration of Robert Anthony Plant in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or,
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Skidmore, No. 2:15-cv-03462-RGK-AGR,
ECF No. 97-3.
294. See generally Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine No. 3 to Exclude
Taurus Audio Recordings; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, Skidmore, No.
2:15-cv-03462-RGK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016), ECF No. 136.
295. See id. at 5.
296. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000).
297. See Pretrial Conference at 1, Skidmore, No. 2:15-cv-03462-RGK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Apr.
25, 2016), ECF No. 202 (granting Motion in Limine to exclude recordings of “Taurus”; “the
only Taurus recordings properly presented to the jury are those that are strictly limited to the
Taurus musical composition as transcribed in the copyrighted 1967 transcription”).
298. See id.
299. See generally Reporter’s Transcript of Jury Trial, Day 6 at 1217-31, Skidmore, No.
2:15-cv-03462-RGK-AGR (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2016), ECF No. 280.
300. See infra note 305 and accompanying text; Reporter’s Transcript of Jury Trial, Day
5, Vol. 1 at 1005, 1022, 1122, Skidmore, No. 2:15-cv-03462-RGK-AGR.

360

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:299

Over Skidmore’s objection, Judge Klausner declined to provide an
inverse ratio instruction to the jury.301 Nonetheless, the jury concluded that Page and Plant had access to “Taurus” prior to composing “Stairway to Heaven,”302 but resolved the case in the defendants’
favor on the ground that the plaintiff had not proven improper
appropriation—that is, substantial similarity of protected expression—under the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic test.303
b. The Ninth Circuit Panel Decision
Skidmore’s appeal focused primarily on the district court’s refusal to let the jury hear the “Taurus” sound recording.304 The appellate
brief devoted just three of the fifty-eight pages of argument to the
contention that the lower court failed to give a proper inverse ratio
rule instruction.305 After all, the jury found for the plaintiff on access, which is tantamount to factual copying in the Ninth Circuit.306
Skidmore nonetheless sought to get an inverse ratio instruction for
the purpose of proving improper appropriation.307 Rentmeester had
not yet been decided, and Skidmore wanted to take advantage of the
Ninth Circuit’s conflation of factual copying and improper appropriation.308 Skidmore pointed the court to the Ninth Circuit
Model Instruction 17.16, noting the commentary in the supplemental instruction stating “the access and substantial similarity
elements of infringement are ‘inextricably linked’ by an inverse
ratio rule.”309 Skidmore also challenged the district court’s jury

301. See Final Jury Instructions, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:15-cv-03462-RGK-AGR
(C.D. Cal. June 23, 2016), Document 273; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 54, Skidmore, 905 F.3d
1116 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56057).
302. See Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1124.
303. See id.
304. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 301, at 11.
305. See id. at 53-55.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. Skidmore’s opening brief was filed on March 18, 2017. See generally Appellant’s
Opening Brief, supra note 301. The Rentmeester decision would not be handed down until
nearly a year later, on February 27, 2018. See generally Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d
1111 (9th Cir. 2018).
309. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 301, at 54 (quoting U.S. Courts for the
Ninth Circuit, Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions 17.16 (2017)).
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instruction relating to the scope of copyright protection for selection
and arrangement of musical elements.310
In response, Led Zeppelin focused much of its brief on defending
the district court’s exercise of its discretion to limit Skidmore to the
“Taurus” deposit copy and bar use of the sound recording at trial.311
With regard to the noninfringement verdict, Led Zeppelin responded first by emphasizing that Skidmore failed to prove similarity
between protectible elements of the works.312 As regards the district
court’s refusal to provide an inverse ratio instruction, Led Zeppelin
contended that the inverse ratio rule applies only if the evidence
establishes “a high degree of access,” and Skidmore had failed to
make such a showing.313 Hence, the district court’s exercise of
discretion to not provide such an instruction was not reversible
error. Led Zeppelin also argued that Skidmore waived his objection
to the selection and arrangement jury instruction, and in any case,
any such error was harmless.314
Although briefed prior to the Rentmeester decision being rendered, the Skidmore Ninth Circuit oral argument took place two
weeks after another panel issued the Rentmeester correction.315 The
Skidmore panel was troubled by various aspects of the trial court’s
handling of the case, leading it to vacate the jury verdict and
remand for a new trial.316
The panel’s handling of the inverse ratio controversy reflected
Rentmeester’s “clarified” framework.317 The panel explained that an
inverse ratio instruction only came into play on the factual copying
prong and not the improper appropriation one.318 The jury did not
reach the question of factual copying because it found in its application of the extrinsic test that any similarity was not substantial;
therefore the panel ruled that the inverse ratio rule did not come
310. See id. at 59-65.
311. See Combined Answering and Opening Brief at 34-58, Skidmore, 905 F.3d 1116 (Nos.
16-56057 & 16-56287).
312. See id. at 59-60.
313. Id. at 60-62 (citing Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003)).
314. See id. at 63-67.
315. Skidmore was argued on March 12, 2018, and filed on September 28, 2018. Skidmore
v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.
2019).
316. See id. at 1116-17.
317. See id. at 1130.
318. See id.
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into play “and any error in not including it was harmless.”319 The
panel elided the fact that the special verdict form, similar to the
Krofft decision, focused exclusively on access and did not actually
frame the ultimate factual copying question. The appellate court
implicitly rectified Krofft’s (and the lower court’s special verdict
form’s omission of factual copying) by directing the lower court on
remand to consider whether to provide an inverse ratio instruction
on the question of factual copying.320 Because there was “substantial
evidence of access” in the case, the panel instructed the district
court to consider whether the evidence of access warranted an
inverse ratio rule instruction at the new trial.321
On the lead sheet issue, the panel ruled that the “Taurus” deposit
copy, rather than any sound recording from which it was transcribed, defined the scope of the copyright.322 Its analysis focused on
jurisprudence interpreting the 1909 Act and distinguished the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton,323
upholding playing of a pre-1978 sound recording as evidence at
trial.324 The court also rejected policy arguments favoring use of the
sound recording as evidence of the musical composition.325 Notwithstanding this ruling on the scope of the “Taurus” copyright, the
panel ruled that Skidmore should have been permitted to play the
“Taurus” sound recording in front of the jury for the limited purpose
of assessing Jimmy Page’s demeanor in denying that “Taurus” influenced his composition of the acoustic introduction to “Stairway to
Heaven.”326
The panel decision revealed a deep fissure in Ninth Circuit copyright jurisprudence and flaws in the lower court’s case management.
The publicity surrounding the case—owing to Led Zeppelin’s place
in the rock ’n roll pantheon and the iconic stature of “Stairway to
319. See id.
320. See id. at 1137.
321. See id. at 1130 (comparing cases where the inverse ratio rule was not used because
claims of access were based on speculation with cases where the rule was used because access
was conceded).
322. See id. at 1135.
323. 212 F.3d 477, 486-87 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the sound recording was played at
trial for purposes of evaluating substantial similarity).
324. See Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1132-33.
325. Id. at 1134.
326. See id. at 1135-36.
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Heaven”—further shone a spotlight on flaws in Ninth Circuit law.327
Led Zeppelin filed for rehearing by the panel or rehearing en banc,
with strong support from a broad range of musicians, composers,
producers, and music publishing and recording industry players.328
Skidmore also petitioned for limited rehearing or rehearing en banc
as well, recognizing the panel’s limitation on the use of the “Taurus”
sound recording solely for purposes of assessing access would make
it nearly impossible to prevail on remand.329 The Ninth Circuit
granted en banc review but without setting forth specific questions.330
c. The En Banc Proceeding
The Ninth Circuit ordered the en banc case to be heard on the
basis of the parties’ briefing to the original panel.331 On the inverse
ratio issue, Skidmore’s appellate brief was nearly worthless. Having
been drafted prior to the Rentmeester decision, its main point—that
Skidmore was entitled to an instruction that the inverse ratio rule
applied to both factual copying and improper appropriation—had
already been rejected by another Ninth Circuit panel.332 Led
Zeppelin’s brief contended that the inverse ratio rule applies only if
the evidence establishes “a high degree of access,” and Skidmore

327. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Led Zeppelin ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Case Goes Back to Trial,
N.Y.TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/arts/music/led-zeppelin-stair
way-to-heaven.html [https://perma.cc/DM2H-B4RC]; Eriq Gardner, Appeals Court Revives
Copyright Case over Led Zeppelin’s “Stairway to Heaven,” HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 28, 2018,
10:20 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/appeals-court-revivescopyright-case-led-zeppelins-stairway-heaven-1147848/ [https://perma.cc/CW22-BVZM].
328. See Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1-2, Skidmore v. Led
Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (Nos. 16-56057 & 16-56287); Motion of 123 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers, along with NSAI and SONA, for Leave to File
Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Defendants for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
at 1, Skidmore, 952 F.3d 1051 (Nos. 16-56057 & 16-56287); Motion for Leave to File Brief
Amici Curiae of the Recording Industry Association of America and the National Music
Publishers Association in Support of the Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1-2, Skidmore, 952
F.3d 1051 (Nos. 16-56057 & 16-56287).
329. See Appellant’s Petition for Limited Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc at 4,
Skidmore, 952 F.3d 1051 (No. 16-56057).
330. See Order, Skidmore, 952 F.3d 1051 (No. 16-56057), ECF No. 90.
331. See id.
332. See Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
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had failed to do so.333 Hence, the district court’s exercise of discretion
to not provide such an instruction was not reversible error. Led
Zeppelin did not question the soundness of the inverse ratio rule nor
suggest that other circuits had abandoned it. Making matters worse,
the court did not permit parties to file updated briefs.334
Two amicus briefs called for wholesale rejection of the inverse
ratio rule. One, filed on behalf of the Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) and the National Music Publishers’ Association
(NMPA), stated that the “Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
have recognized [that] this rule ‘confuses more than it clarifies,’”
quoting Arc Music.335 The brief failed to point out that the Second
Circuit continues to apply the inverse ratio rule on the factual
copying prong (as has always been the proper interpretation) and
the Seventh Circuit retains the rule.336 The brief also neglected to
distinguish between the factual copying and improper appropriation
prongs, emphasizing that a high degree of access should not result
in a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity.337 Even though
the brief was drafted after the Ninth Circuit’s Rentmeester decision,
it somewhat surprisingly avoided noting how that decision had
rectified the very problem it was identifying.
A second brief, filed by a group of nineteen law professors led by
Professor Mark Lemley, also asked the court to “abandon” the
inverse ratio rule altogether.338 Mischaracterizing out-of-circuit
precedent as having rejected the rule, it asked the Ninth Circuit to
join its “sister circuits” in this effort.339 As we have seen, it is hardly
the case that other circuits have abandoned the rule. Further, the
333. See Combined Answering and Opening Brief, supra note 311 (citing Rice v. Fox Broad.
Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003)).
334. Skidmore’s counsel specifically requested the Ninth Circuit to clarify the scope of the
en banc proceeding, which the court declined to do. See Appellant Skidmore’s Letter for
Clarification of Scope of Rehearing En Banc, Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1051; Order, Skidmore,
952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. June 11, 2019) (No. 16-56057).
335. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Recording Industry Association of America and the
National Music Publishers Association in Support of Defendants-Appellees on En Banc
Rehearing at 3, Skidmore, 952 F.3d 1051 (Nos. 16-56057 & 16-56287), ECF No. 120-2 (quoting
Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961)).
336. Id. at 7-8.
337. See id. at 7.
338. See Brief Amici Curiae of 19 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioner
Led Zeppelin at 2, 7-8, Skidmore, 952 F.3d 1051 (Nos. 16-56057 & 16-56287), ECF No. 106-1.
339. See id. at 8.
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brief was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in
which circumstantial evidence works. Treating “access” as a separate requirement, the brief made the altogether unreasoned argument that once proof of access makes factual copying plausible, “it
does not influence the strength of the inference of copying at all”
and should therefore drop out of the picture, requiring courts to
focus exclusively on the similarities between the works.340
The illogicality of this position cannot be overstated. As we demonstrated in Part I, proof of access is of significant probative value
precisely when similarities exist between the works because then it
contributes—directly—to the narrative about copying. While the
brief ridiculed the rule and suggested that more—or less—proof on
an issue was without “mean[ing]” by offering a series of off-topic
hypotheticals, not once did it recognize the manner in which inferences combine together, during proof by circumstantial evidence.341
During oral argument before the en banc panel, the court asked
Led Zeppelin’s lawyer to address the inverse ratio rule and its
continuing validity in the Ninth Circuit. Despite acknowledging the
court’s clarification in Rentmeester, his answer merely reiterated the
erroneous view of the amicus briefs discussed above: that the rule
deserved to be rejected as it had been in other circuits.342 In her
340. Id. at 6.
341. Id. at 14. Many of the brief ’s faulty arguments were drawn from two commentators
who have long been critical of the inverse ratio rule. See 3 PATRY, supra note 65; Aronoff,
supra note 16. Much like many courts and scholars, these commentators do not appreciate the
working of circumstantial evidence. Patry, in particular, makes the following erroneous
observation:
While it is true that one cannot copy something to which one does not have
access, it is also true that one can have complete access to a copyrighted work
(indeed have it pasted on the wall of your office when creating your own work)
but not copy that work. No degree of access necessarily leads to any degree of
copying. The inverse ratio theory is based on a false postulate.
3 PATRY, supra note 65, § 9:34 (footnote omitted). The fallacy here should be obvious. Patry
assumes a causal relationship between access and copying. Yet, access is certainly not a cause
of copying. Having access to a work does not make copying more likely. All the same, access
is a necessary condition for copying. As an antecedent condition, it thus allows for an inference
to be drawn as to copying when other evidence points in that direction. Inferential logic need
not be causal. The parallel is motive. Having a motive to do something is certainly not
causally related to doing it—that is, it does not cause it to be done. All the same, when other
evidence points to such a causal connection, motive—as an antecedent condition—buttresses
that inference. For an excellent account, see John H. Wigmore, Circumstantial Evidence in
Poisoning Cases, 6 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 292, 306 (1888).
342. Transcript of Oral Argument, Skidmore, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 16-56057).
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opinion for the majority, Judge McKeown unfortunately did just
this.
Addressing the plaintiff ’s jury instruction challenges in the case,
the majority opinion traced the evolution of the inverse ratio rule
within the Ninth Circuit, acknowledging the error that had originated in Krofft, as well as its confusing terminology.343 Yet, it chose
not to correct Krofft, the source of confusion for this rule and the
very basis for the circuit’s problematic test for infringement. The
majority recognized that while the panel in Rentmeester had corrected the circuit’s application of the rule, the controversy in Gaye
had nevertheless sown further doubt over the rule and its utility.344
Putting this inconsistency and confusion together with academic
commentary criticizing the rule, the court expressed its own rationale to be skeptical of the rule.345
According to the majority, the rule unfairly advantaged more popular works that were likely to be more widely distributed. Because
innumerable works could be easily disseminated on the internet,
this enabled plaintiff-owners of such works to establish access (to
them, by a defendant) rather easily, thereby lowering the requisite
similarity for them to establish actual copying under the inverse
ratio rule.346 Given this reduced burden for such works, the majority
characterized the rule as the “inverse burden rule” to connote its
disparate treatment of widely disseminated, that is, popular
works.347 Coupled with the confusion and inconsistency seen in the
circuit’s application of the rule, this unfairness was sufficient for the
majority to abrogate the rule, purporting to join its “sister circuits”
in this rejection.348
Now, as we have seen, other circuits—including the Second—
have not, as even rudimentary cite-checking would have revealed,
abrogated the rule.349 Further, the confusion and inconsistency that
the court was reacting to was entirely a creation of the Ninth
Circuit, and had thankfully failed to make its way into other
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1065-67.
Id. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1068-69.
Id.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
See supra Part II.C.2.
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circuits’ more streamlined application of the rule to the issue of
actual copying. More importantly, Rentmeester had done an admirable job of eliminating much of that confusion and distilling the
rule down to its analytical core. This then leaves the court’s own
reasons for rejecting the rule—the “inverse burden” rationale—
which unfortunately does not withstand scrutiny either.350
The whole premise of the court’s “inverse burden” argument was
that popular works were more likely to be widely disseminated, thus
making it easy for plaintiffs basing their claims on such works to
establish “access,” which would in turn reduce the amount of
similarity needed to prove copying.351 Yet, in what sense this is
“unfair” remains unclear. To the court, the unfairness was because
“nothing in copyright law suggests that a work deserves stronger
legal protection simply because it is more popular or owned by
better-funded rights holders.”352 The court’s search for absolute
parity between works of all kinds is altogether misplaced, and
indeed has never been how copyright law works. Nowhere does
copyright law promise to treat all works in identical manner.
Factual works are treated differently from highly imaginative
works, which are in turn treated differently from derivative works,
and so on.353 The unique doctrinal wrinkles that attach to each
category make an infringement claim easy to establish in each
instance. That is hardly a problem; it is instead a key feature of
copyright law. An evidentiary rule advantaging popular works is
no more problematic than a rule advantaging highly creative works
over factual ones. In some sense, this functions as an added incentive for the creator. Indeed, to the extent that dissemination in
its widest form is one of the stated goals of the copyright system,
providing “stronger” protection to widely disseminated works by
making it easier to establish their infringement is an integral aspect of copyright law.
As technological advances expand access to nearly all types of
works of authorship, copyright infringement analysis integrates
350. See Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1069.
351. Id. at 1068.
352. Id.
353. See Balganesh, supra note 6, at 203, 221 (observing how the infringement analysis embodies an intermediate step wherein decision makers fix the standard of scrutiny applicable
to a work based on protectable content).
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that shift into its infringement tests. With the Rentmeester correction, this shift in no way limits the defendant’s ability to prove that
any similarity does not constitute improper appropriation.
In the end, the Ninth Circuit’s unwillingness to allow fresh
briefing on the issue, notwithstanding the intervening Rentmeester
decision, produced a poorly reasoned decision. The court was all too
ready to end the inverse ratio rule in the circuit, owing in large part
to the confusion and uncertainty seen in the court’s application of
the rule within the jurisdiction, and a poorly researched law professor’s brief portraying a façade of scholarly and judicial consensus
around the problems underlying the rule.
d. Aftermath
In addition to its decision to jettison the inverse ratio rule altogether despite the Rentmeester correction, and entirely on the basis
of faulty analysis and briefing, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision
in Skidmore can be faulted for failing to address the real longstanding issues plaguing its copyright jurisprudence. Much as it
purported to join its “sister circuits,” the Ninth Circuit rendered
itself an outlier on the inverse ratio rule.354
Further, its faulty discussion of out-of-circuit case law has since
prompted other courts—most prominently the Sixth Circuit—to reevaluate its own reliance on the inverse ratio rule. In one recent
case, the court was asked to apply the rule and stated:
More fundamental problems lie with the “inverse-ratio rule.”...
[I]t does not appear that this circuit has meaningfully relied on
the rule, ... in any binding precedent.... In any event, the
“inverse-ratio rule” appears to be on its last legs. Fearing that
the rule has little use in the modern, “digitally interconnected
world” in which “the concept of ‘access’ is increasingly diluted,”
the Ninth Circuit recently abrogated the rule in its circuit,
“join[ing] the majority of [its] sister circuits that have considered
the inverse-ratio rule and have correctly chosen to excise it from
copyright analysis.”... The only circuit it identified as still endorsing the inverse-ratio rule is ours.... So questions remain
354. See Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1079 (“[W]e take the opportunity to reject the inverse ratio
rule.”).
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whether the inverse-ratio rule applies (or should apply) in our
circuit. But we do not answer them today.355

The Sixth Circuit failed to cite-check the Ninth Circuit’s assertions about sister circuit law.356 The court’s error in Skidmore is
thus likely to have an impact beyond the Ninth Circuit. Only time,
however, will reveal the full extent of that impact. Perhaps the
greatest casualty of the Skidmore debacle is that the Ninth Circuit
missed a rare opportunity to address the real problems plaguing
its copyright infringement jurisprudence. In a concurring opinion,
one member of the court went to great length to detail this missed
opportunity,357 which goes to show how the en banc majority might
have been better off spending its efforts correcting other aspects of
the infringement analysis.
E. Nuanced Application: The U.K. High Court
While U.S. courts and commentators have failed to appreciate
the basic logic of circumstantial evidence underpinning the inverse
ratio rule, courts in other jurisdictions appear to have had few such
problems. In Sheeran v. Chokri, the Chancery Division of the U.K.
High Court invoked and applied the logic of the inverse ratio rule
principle with care and sophistication.358 The case involved an
allegation of copyright infringement made by Sam Chokri against
the well-known musician and songwriter Ed Sheeran.359 Central to
Chokri’s claim was the contention that Sheeran had copied from
Chokri’s work, and the court rightly noted that the question of
“copying” was “at the heart th[e] case.”360 The claim of copying was
based entirely on circumstantial evidence, and relied on three bases:

355. Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 536-37 n.1
(6th Cir. 2020) (alterations in original).
356. See id.
357. Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1079-80 (Watford, J., concurring). These include the Ninth
Circuit’s confusing and loose standards relating to improper appropriation: the “total concept
and feel” framework, the uncritical protection for compilations of unprotectable elements, and
its lenient acceptance of experts engaging in “selective reduction” of musical transcriptions.
Id.
358. See Sheeran v. Chokri [2022] EWHC 827 (Ch) IL-2018-000095, [7]-[13] (Eng.).
359. Id. at [1]-[6].
360. Id. at [7].
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(1) the similarity between the musical works, (2) Sheeran’s access
to the protected work, and (3) Sheeran’s prior behavior, which
Chokri alleged showed a pattern of borrowing music from other
songs.361 In a persuasive opinion, the court closely examined the
combined inference that it could draw from the evidence and
rejected the copying claim.362
Writing for the court, Justice Zacaroli set out its approach to combining the inferences at issue. And while the opinion did not
reference the inverse ratio rule by name, its description of the
relevant rule bears all the hallmarks of that rule:
In every case, it must be a question of fact and degree whether
the extent of the alleged infringer’s access to the original work,
combined with the extent of the similarities, raises a sufficient
possibility of copying to shift the evidential burden. Where, for
example, the original work was highly individual or intricate,
and the alleged infringing work was very close to it, then only
limited evidence of access may be sufficient in order to shift the
burden. The same would not be true, on the other hand, where
the original work was simple and involved relatively common
elements.363

The court’s reference to “combined” inferences and the idea that
evidence of access could be “limited” when the degree of similarity
was great is a clear and direct statement of the inverse ratio rule.
The court then proceeded to examine the evidence on each of the
three circumstantial bases for the claim of copying. Justice Zacaroli
first undertook an elaborate examination of the musical similarities
and dissimilarities between the works and the parties’ competing
accounts of how they came to be.364 He then proceeded to examine
the evidence of access, which consisted of the allegedly infringed
song being played on the radio, the manner in which it was otherwise publicized, and evidence of common friends who were alleged
to have shared the music with Sheeran.365 Again, the court unpacked components of the evidence at each stage of the analysis to
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at [7]-[13].
See id. at [207]-[221].
Id. at [25].
Id. at [29]-[77].
Id. at [78]-[99].
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set out the strength of the inference that each produced, to conclude
that the evidence of access—taken as a whole—was “at best
speculative.”366 On the final basis of prior acts of copying, the court
was again discerning. In examining the evidence showing that
Sheeran “referenced and credited other writers,” which was introduced to show his propensity to copy, the court found it to be of
minimal “probative value,” concluding instead that “the fact that
someone is in the habit of openly recognising and crediting the work
of others makes it less likely that they would set out to steal the
creative work of others.”367
Putting all this together, Justice Zacaroli then “st[ood] back” from
the individual details of the evidence and examined the big picture,
combining the inferential elements drawn from different parts of the
evidence.368 And upon doing this, he concluded that the case for
copying was weak and thus found for Sheeran.369
A few things are noteworthy in Justice Zacaroli’s astute and
judicious analysis. First, even though he relies on the inverse ratio
rule, Justice Zacaroli does not rely on a precise sliding scale. To the
contrary, his approach merely recognized the need for judgment and
common sense, which rendered it sufficiently convincing.370 Second,
his scrutiny of the evidentiary record with a fine-toothed comb is
commendable not just for its attention to detail, but for its effort to
relate each element of that scrutiny to the putative final conclusion:
that is, the question of copying. Nowhere in the analysis does he
treat an intermediate conclusion as relevant for its own sake. And
third, recognizing the inferential nature of the inquiry—which
focuses on the question of copying—he does not limit himself to the
questions of access and copying. Instead, in keeping with the wellworn ideas of circumstantial evidence, which suggest looking to all
aspects of an incident, he considers other pieces of evidence that
could be potentially probative of copying, such as past behavior and
a pattern of conduct. While he eventually found them to be unhelpful, his willingness to recognize their utility evinces a recognition
and regard for the manner in which circumstantial evidence works,
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id. at [146].
Id. at [150].
Id. at [201].
Id.
See id. at [184].
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without the artificial limits that U.S. courts have imposed by
limiting circumstantial evidence of copying to access and similarity.
The U.K. Chancery Division’s Sheeran opinion vividly illustrates
how the inverse ratio rule ought to be deployed in practice, with an
appreciation for the role and significance of circumstantial evidence.
Devoid of its fancy nomenclature and controversial origins, the rule
played a crucial role in the court’s finding of noninfringement. And
in doing so, it aptly revealed—almost in direct rebuttal to the Ninth
Circuit—that the rule need not favor plaintiffs and render the proof
of copying easier. When appropriately and conscientiously applied,
it operates as a balanced rule grounded in cogent logic and common
sense.
III. INTEGRATING COPYRIGHT AND EVIDENCE LAW
The account just provided of the inverse ratio rule and its problematic invocation and application among some courts is reflective
of a problem that is seen more broadly in much of copyright adjudication: the reluctance of courts to integrate into copyright adjudication the myriad rules and principles of procedure and evidence
that they routinely deploy in other contexts.
The problem dates back to the very origins of the modern test for
copyright infringement. As is well known, the seminal Arnstein test
for copyright infringement—which continues to remain the nationwide standard, but for Krofft in the Ninth Circuit—was the product
of a deep disagreement over the standard for summary judgment
reflected in Rule 56 of the then newly developed Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.371 In an effort to avoid having much of the adjudication decided on summary judgment, the author of the Arnstein
majority opinion chose to treat aspects of the inquiry as pure questions of fact to be determined by a jury. 372 In the years since, while
courts have gradually whittled away at the rigidity of this classification and become more willing to decide infringement claims on
motions for summary judgment (and motions to dismiss), some

371. Balganesh, supra note 1, at 796 (describing how disagreement over the then-new Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure influenced the Arnstein court in its framing of the
infringement standard).
372. Id. at 831-48.
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circuits have nevertheless adhered to the original formulation and
actively forbidden this practice.373
Perhaps more troubling than its connection to summary judgment, the Arnstein framework also framed evidentiary rules for the
copyright infringement analysis entirely out of whole cloth, with no
reference at all to the age-old principles and concepts of evidence
law.374 A prime example here is the framework’s prohibition on the
use of expert testimony on the improper appropriation prong of the
inquiry, regardless of the subject matter at issue and its complexity.375 The inquiry instead insists that the question be turned
over to a jury without any guidance, so that their subjective reaction
to the works (and their similarity) can be ascertained.376 Again, this
prohibition has proven to be deeply problematic as the nature of
copyrightable subject has come to encompass some forms of expression, such as computer software, that lay juries cannot comprehend without expert assistance.377
While judicial and scholarly confusion surrounding the inverse
ratio rule may not have been driven by the same type of strategic
concerns that the Arnstein framework sought to put into place, it
nevertheless is part of the same pattern. Federal courts need to
recognize that copyright adjudication is not exceptional and ought
to apply general rules and adjectival formulations that have long
been developed for federal adjudication. The rules and principles of
evidence remain a core part of that body of law, and thus demand
more rational integration into the framework for copyright adjudication.
However, evidence law presents copyright adjudication with two
mutually reinforcing structural realities that render its integration
into copyright somewhat different from the manner in which the
373. Again, most notorious is the Ninth Circuit, which actively forbids courts from deciding
the second prong of the test—the intrinsic prong—as a matter of law. See, e.g., Rentmeester
v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Only the extrinsic test’s application may
be decided by the court as a matter of law.”).
374. See 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
375. See id. (categorically holding that on the second prong “expert testimony [is] irrelevant”).
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., Antonick v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2016) (refusing
to allow the use of expert testimony during a comparison of computer software code); see also
Balganesh & Menell, supra note 9.
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rules of procedure might work therein. First, while the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) codify much of the law of evidence, modern
evidence law also embodies principles and ideas—about inferential
logic and the nature of fact-finding—that do not find their way into
those rules.378 They instead operate at the level of principles, but are
nevertheless constructive and influential in a variety of different
ways.379 In addition, the rules themselves are replete with delegations of authority to courts to decide evidentiary issues on a discretionary basis, thus rendering them much more like standards
rather than bright-line rules.380 The process of integrating evidence
law into copyright must therefore be sensitive to both of these
features, which can nevertheless be suitably harnessed towards the
improvement of copyright adjudication. In keeping with these features, this Part looks at how the rules of evidence and evidentiary
principles can guide copyright adjudication.
A. Rule-Based Integration
Ever since they were brought into effect in 1975, the FRE have
provided federal courts with a uniform set of evidentiary rules for
them to use in “virtually all” federal proceedings.381 Produced over
seven years by a Supreme Court-appointed committee, the FRE are
detailed, yet not comprehensive in their coverage. The FRE declares
its overarching purpose as ensuring that every proceeding is administered “fairly,” avoiding “unjustifiable expense and delay,” and
“promot[ing] the development of evidence law.”382 Its end is described as “ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”383
Rule 1101 of the FRE makes clear that the FRE is to apply to all
proceedings before all federal courts, including specifically in “civil
cases and proceedings” without significant exception.384 Federal
copyright adjudication brought under the federal copyright statute
378. See Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
GEO. L.J. 125, 125 (1973).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. FED. R. EVID. 102 (discussing the purpose of these rules).
383. Id.
384. FED. R. EVID. 1101.
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is thus clearly within the coverage of the FRE. Despite this reality,
the framework for adjudicating copyright infringement claims
deviates in various ways from the FRE, or at the very least pays
scant attention to the guidance offered therein. Much of this is
perhaps because that framework was crafted decades before the
FRE came into existence, and courts have unfortunately been reluctant to revisit it in the years since. A few FRE rules in particular
deserve special mention.
1. The Exclusion of Expert Testimony (Rule 702)
The modern test for copyright infringement divides the inquiry
into two stages: factual copying and improper appropriation.385 The
former examines whether the defendant copied from the plaintiff,
while the latter assesses the propriety (or legality) of such copying,
once found to exist.386 While the framework allows a court to use
expert testimony to guide the inquiry on the first stage, it at the
same time expressly forbids the jury from obtaining any expert
testimony on the second stage.387 The original rationale for this
discrepancy appears to have been the belief that any expert testimony on the second prong would serve to cloud the jury’s subjective
reaction to the work.388 Further, while the prohibition originated in
less rigid terms, it has since been converted into a hard rule by
courts over the years.389 As originally contemplated, therefore, the
framework as applied today disallows any use of experts on improper appropriation. The jury is meant to react to the works in an
unguided manner, regardless of whether they understand its
meaning (for example, a work in a foreign language).

385. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See id.
389. Id. at 473 (“Expert testimony of musicians may also be received, but it will in no way
be controlling on the issue of illicit copying, and should be utilized only to assist in
determining the reactions of lay auditors.”). As this observation makes clear, Arnstein never
sought to fully prohibit the use of expert testimony on the improper appropriation prong.
Later courts, unfortunately, read it that way. See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) (reading Arnstein to have not permitted expert testimony on the
second prong).
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The absurdity of this position has not been lost on scholars.390 Nor
indeed on some courts.391 When computer software came to be included as copyrightable subject matter, courts around the country
developed a new framework for assessing infringing in relation to
such works wherein they modified the general rule to allow juries
to receive expert testimony on such software.392 Yet, in so doing they
indirectly reified the prohibition in relation to other subject matter.393
Courts adjudicating copyright infringement often acknowledge
that expert testimony would be helpful but find themselves bound
by the prohibition of the framework just described. The irony here
is that the FRE expressly allows a court to allow an expert to testify
if it “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence.”394 It is
precisely in relation to complicated subject matter where juries will
have a hard time understanding the evidence that expert testimony
is most useful. By vesting courts with the discretion to thus determine the utility of expert testimony, the FRE thus moves away from
any bright-line prohibition of the kind contemplated by the infringement framework. And yet, no court has embraced that discretion,
except in relation to computer software, with the notable exception
of the Ninth Circuit.395 Rule 702 would call for the hard prohibition
to be lifted, and perhaps converted into a default (even if not done
away with) that a court could move away from when the jury can
assess the works on their own.396
2. Limits on Limiting Instructions (Rules 105 and 403)
Rule 105 of the FRE allows a court to admit evidence for one
purpose but not for another and thus “restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”397 It thus embodies
what is known as a “limiting instruction” wherein a jury is given
some evidence but allowed to use it for one purpose and then
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See, e.g., Balganesh & Menell, supra note 9.
See, e.g., Antonick v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062, 1067 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016).
Altai, 982 F.2d at 713.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
See, e.g., Antonick, 841 F.3d at 1067 n.4.
See FED. R. EVID. 702.
FED. R. EVID. 105.
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expressly prohibited from using it for other purposes.398 All the
same, the official comments make clear that the rule can be of
limited utility and that courts must weigh the “availability and
effectiveness” of this practice before deploying it.399 The comments
suggest that when such limiting instructions are futile, the court
should disallow such evidence altogether under Rule 403 for “unfair
prejudice.”400 Further, the scholarly commentary is extensive,
showing limiting instructions to be of little value in requiring juries
to keep evidence out of their consideration.401
Despite the conversation and debate about limiting instructions
in the world of evidence law, copyright law routinely deploys such
instructions in relation to expert testimony. Such testimony is
permitted (and helpful) on one prong, but forbidden (even though
helpful) on another. Insofar as a jury is empowered to adjudicate the
first prong, courts are thus forced to rely on limiting instructions.
Alternatively, they choose to decide the first prong on summary
judgment in order to avoid this dilemma.
A more logical route for courts to go—embracing the directions of
the FRE—is for them to recognize the futility of limiting instructions and to modify the sequence and/or structure of the infringement inquiry in appropriate ways. Possibilities include eliminating
all expert testimony from the jury’s consideration when the subject
matter is simple, reversing the sequence of a jury’s determination,
allowing expert testimony to be used by a jury on the second prong
as well, or at its extreme empaneling two independent juries with
one for each prong. Again, what matters is less the particular
solution that courts develop and more that they recognize (1) the
deficiencies of limiting instructions and (2) the discretion that the
FRE gives them to compensate for these deficiencies when they
determine particular evidence to be helpful/prejudicial.
398. See generally Note, The Limiting Instruction—Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 264 (1966); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
399. FED. R. EVID. 105, advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“The availability
and effectiveness of this practice must be taken into consideration in reaching a decision
whether to exclude for unfair prejudice under Rule 403.”).
400. Id.
401. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65
STAN. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (2013) (noting how the dominant view is that such instructions “do
not work” and critiquing it to argue that they work “imperfectly”).
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B. Principle-Based Integration
Independent of the formal rules embodied in the FRE, evidence
law also embodies a set of principles that are perhaps of even
greater import to copyright adjudication.402 Unlike evidentiary rules,
these principles often take color and content from common sense
intuitions about proof and causation.403 All the same, because they
are not formally codified in a single source, they are to be seen in
different doctrinal domains and in judicial decisions grappling with
mechanisms of proof therein. The intuitions about circumstantial
proof and the role of inferences that inform the inverse ratio rule
and the striking similarity doctrine, for instance, originate in such
evidentiary principles.404 The inverse ratio rule is far from exhausting the domain of relevant evidentiary principles for copyright
adjudication.
1. Understanding Circumstantial Proof
Circumstantial—or indirect—proof, as noted previously, is a
staple of the landscape in almost all areas of law requiring proof.
Copyright adjudication is no exception. Yet circumstantial evidence
is qualitatively different from direct evidence, which requires courts
to appreciate the manner in which it is to be deployed in their factfinding. Because the hallmark of circumstantial evidence is the
process of inferential reasoning, courts using such evidence need to
understand the obvious connection between inferences and probative value to offer clear reasons for their inferences. Instead, a more
common—and erroneous—practice sees them treat conclusions from
inferences as equivalent to proving individual elements of a multielement doctrine, thus invoking the standard of proof commonly
deployed for civil trials, that is, the preponderance of evidence
standard.405
402. For a general account of the distinction, see Mitchell N. Berman, How Practices Make
Principles, and How Principles Make Rules (Univ. Pa. L. Sch. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper, Paper No.
22-03, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4003631 [https://perma.cc/
57YB-SFXD].
403. Id. at 44.
404. See supra Part I.
405. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting how when clear and convincing evidence of access is
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The problem here is, of course, that inference-based circumstantial proof is scalar rather than binary and thus operates on a
continuum.406 This is why it is common to speak of the strength of an
inference. Yet, focusing on proof of individual elements is treated as
a binary determination: either the plaintiff has proven something
based on the preponderance standard or not. And this is where the
Ninth Circuit’s approach to infringement, originating in Krofft,
committed an error of epic proportions in failing to understand the
circumstantial role that access plays in the process. When Krofft
converted access from being a basis for a court to draw an inference
towards actual copying into a freestanding element of the infringement analysis, it effectively stripped access of its inferential role
altogether.407 Instead, courts now have to prove the existence of
access, to the standard of a preponderance of evidence. It thus
replaced the scalarity of access with a binary requirement. Again,
a clearer appreciation of the basics of circumstantial proof would
have likely prevented this.
2. The Best Evidence Principle
It has long been a fundamental precept of evidence law that a
fact-finder must be presented with the “best evidence” available on
an issue when making a determination.408 As commonly understood
today, the precept is viewed primarily through the lens of the best
evidence rule, embodied in Rule 1002 of the FRE, which is limited
to documents.409 It provides that when the contents of a document
are to be proven, an “original ... is required.”410 Underlying the rule
is the idea that the original is always the best evidence of the
content, which a fact-finder should have access to.
presented the quantum of proof required to show substantial similarity may be lower than
when access is shown merely by a preponderance of the evidence); Florentine Art Studio, Inc.
v. Vedet K. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 532, 535 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that plaintiff “failed to
prove [the] elements [of access and similarity] by a preponderance of the evidence”).
406. For general accounts of the distinction between scalar and binary directives, see Kevin
M. Clermont, Rules, Standards, and Such, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 751, 770 (2020) (“Binary propositions are those that are true or false ... [s]calar propositions can take intermediate values.”);
Larry Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 85 (2008).
407. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
408. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988).
409. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
410. Id.
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Yet, as some scholars have convincingly shown, the principle
underlying the rule is a fundamental axiom of all evidence law that
a party has an obligation to present—and a court a duty to
consider—the “best reasonably available evidence” on an issue when
making a decision.411 Indeed, in this argument the nature of the
adversarial process demands a greater enforcement of this principle,
so as to ensure that parties’ strategic behavior does not interfere
with a court’s ability to discern the truth.412
Of course, determining what constitutes the “best” evidence in a
situation is a heavily contextual determination, especially in light
of the countervailing concern that some kinds of evidence might
cause undue prejudice. All the same, this kind of a contextual
inquiry allows a court to evaluate the idea of “best” not just in terms
of the formal comparison of prejudice and probative value but also
the types of burdens—evidentiary and otherwise—that parties
routinely face when seeking to prove the existence of a fact. Indeed,
it is precisely such a contextual determination that under the “best
reasonably available evidence” principle that copyright law would
stand to benefit from.413
A controversial issue that arose in some recent copyright infringement cases involves the type of evidence a plaintiff should be
able to rely on to prove infringement of a musical work.414 Copyright
law today draws an important distinction between a musical work,
understood as the underlying composition, and a sound recording,
which is a fixation of the music “sounds” in a tangible medium.415
The wrinkle is, however, that while the Copyright Act of 1976 protects both categories of works independently, the preceding statute,
the Act of 1909, protected only musical works. Plaintiffs who
produced both musical compositions and sound recordings under the
old statute are thus limited in their protection. The more troubling
evidentiary question is, however, when plaintiffs who are limited in
their protection to the underlying musical work seek to establish
infringement by relying on the sound recording as evidence of the
work at trial.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Nance, supra note 408, at 238.
Id. at 234-44.
Id. at 238.
See, e.g., Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2022).
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The distinction here should be obvious. When reliance is placed
on the sound recording in such situations, it is not in an effort to
gain protection for the sound recording. It is instead in an effort to
offer the sound recording as evidence of the musical work rather
than as the work in itself. Most courts to have considered the issue
have formulaically examined the question of protectability under
the statute and ruled that allowing such reliance would be too
prejudicial to the defendant in light of the lack of protection for
sound recordings.416
Yet, this reasoning does not capture the import of the best
evidence principle. As has been pointed out, in numerous situations
of musical creativity, the sound recording is in fact the best
available evidence of the musical work. This is so especially when
the artist is not formally trained in musical notation and chooses to
compose and record simultaneously. In these situations, categorically disallowing the introduction of the sound recording both disadvantages a segment of artists and deprives the court of the best
evidence of the work as created. Again, a more appropriate approach
would be to look beyond the formal categories of the 1909 Act, which
is the usual basis for a court’s assessment of prejudice on the
question, and consider what would facilitate greater accuracy in the
overall adjudicatory process, the core insight of the best evidence
principle.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the last century, copyright law has undoubtedly grown more complex and technical. The proliferation of new
subject matter such as computer software, as well as the emergence
of new technological means of creation and dissemination, have both
been responsible for this reality. This burgeoning complexity has, in
turn, forced many courts and scholars into treating the subject (of
copyright) as a specialized domain with its own set of rules and
principles. While this exceptionalism has facilitated greater expertise within the field, it has at the same time imposed blinders on
courts’ (and scholars’) engagement with copyright doctrine, at times
416. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their First Motion in Limine, Griffin
v. Sheeran, No. 17-cv-5221, 2019 WL 2604571 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019).
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making them ignore the basic reality that copyright law adjudication draws on fundamental features of the overall legal system,
including its procedural and evidentiary mechanisms.
The recent confusion over copyright law’s inverse ratio rule can
be seen as a direct consequence of this exceptionalism. The doctrine
originated in an era when federal courts readily recognized the
seamlessness between copyright adjudication and other forms of
federal litigation, allowing them to draw on the basic ideas and
principles of evidence to shape the process through which plaintiffs
might prove copying as a requirement of the copyright infringement
action. Recognizing the fundamentally inferential nature of circumstantial proof and the manner in which the probative values of
individual pieces of evidence combine together in the construction
of such proof, the rule emerged to simultaneously affirm and guide
the basic subjectivity of the inferential process. It was never intended as a rigid mathematical formula but instead as a rough
heuristic for courts to process the inferences that they were making
during the process. And to this end, it drew on basic insights from
the principles of circumstantial evidence that have long been deployed in innumerable other contexts.
As access and similarity developed as the principal points of
inference for circumstantial proof of copying, the inverse ratio rule
allowed courts to maintain the critical distinction between treating
them as independent bases of inference and treating them as elements of the prima facie case. In allowing courts to use them as
bases of inference, it also enabled them to overcome the rigidity and
complexity of the standard of proof demanded of elements, which
would have been fundamentally counterproductive to the inferential
process. Unfortunately, in due course many courts—most notably,
the Ninth Circuit—failed to appreciate the significance and analytical logic of this distinction. Notwithstanding that court’s growing
copyright docket, it has failed to grasp the core logic behind the
inverse ratio rule—first by applying the rule to improper appropriation and not solely to factual copying, and most recently by abrogating the rule entirely. This process was accelerated and facilitated in
no small measure by copyright scholars, who also failed to engage
with ideas and principles from evidence law, and focused too narrowly on the working of copyright doctrine and its consequences.
The process reached an unfortunate crescendo in the Ninth Circuit’s
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Skidmore case, where the court rather carelessly abrogated the rule
in the mistaken belief that it was joining other courts around the
country and reintroducing much needed coherence into the process
of proving copying. Sadly, as we have shown, neither was true.
Even if abrogated by name in one circuit, the inverse ratio rule
continues to operate as intended in other circuits—both by name
and under other related designations—where it has proven to have
none of the problems that its critics have attributed to it. To the
contrary, in those jurisdictions it continues to allow courts to better
integrate the insights of evidence law into copyright, much against
the trend of copyright exceptionalism. Only time will tell whether
such integration can buck the growing trend towards copyright
exceptionalism. For now, the inverse ratio rule remains a reminder
of the obvious benefits of integration.

